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House Hansard - 146

44th Parl. 1st Sess.
December 12, 2022 11:00AM
  • Dec/12/22 12:08:03 p.m.
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  • Re: Bill S-8 
moved that Bill S-8, An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, to make consequential amendments to other Acts and to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, be read the second time and referred to a committee. He said: Mr. Speaker, for almost 10 months, Canadians have watched in shock and horror at Russia's unjust, abhorrent and illegal invasion of Ukraine. On February 24, 2022, without provocation, Russian forces initiated this egregious step, which is a blatant violation of international law, the charter of the United Nations and the rules-based international order. The attacks have caused widespread devastation of Ukrainian infrastructure and property, as well as unnecessary deaths of Ukrainians, including civilians. These actions are a continuation and acceleration of the violent steps taken by Russia since early 2014 to undermine Ukrainian security, sovereignty and independence. The Government of Canada is committed to supporting those fleeing the destruction and devastation in Ukraine and to providing a safe haven for those fleeing their war-torn home country. As we said since the beginning, whether it is military, political or economic support, Canada will continue to be there for Ukraine and hold Russia accountable. In the face of such brazen disregard for the international order, the Government of Canada has responded to the Russian invasion of Ukraine through the use of economic measures, including sanctions, to send a clear and unequivocal message that the aggression displayed by the Russian regime will not be tolerated. These measures apply pressure on the Russian leadership to end its senseless war, which has resulted in the loss of thousands of lives and caused indescribable suffering to the people of Ukraine. These measures are the latest example of Canada's unwavering commitment to Ukraine and its people. Since the invasion of Ukraine commenced in February, the Government of Canada has imposed sanctions under the Special Economic Measures Act on almost 1,200 individuals in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Further targeted sanctions are planned in response to Russian aggression, demonstrating that Canada is a leader in the international effort to hold Russian leaders accountable for this violent and unprovoked attack on Ukraine. More recently, the Government of Canada imposed additional sanctions under SEMA against Iranian officials in response to the Iranian regime's ongoing grave breaches of international peace and security and gross human rights violations. These breaches and violations include its systemic persecution of women and, in particular, the egregious actions committed by Iran's so-called morality police, which led to the death of Mahsa Amini while in their custody. Targeted sanctions have been imposed against senior Iranian officials and prominent entities that directly implement repressive measures, violate human rights and spread the Iranian regime's propaganda and misinformation. The legislative amendments we are introducing to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act would provide Canada with much needed abilities to better align government-imposed sanctions with authorities related to immigration enforcement and access to Canada. The IRPA defines when a person is inadmissible to Canada and establishes the applicable criteria for all foreign nationals and permanent residents who seek to enter or remain in Canada. However, IRPA, as it stands, is incongruous with our inadmissibility regime. Its inadmissibility provisions do not clearly align with the basis for imposing the majority of SEMA sanctions issued against Russia and Iran. Issuing sanctions against these countries on the grounds of a grave breach of international peace and security, which has resulted in the serious situation that we see today, does not automatically trigger inadmissibility. This means that most individuals sanctioned pursuant to SEMA may nevertheless have access to travel to, enter or remain in Canada if they are not otherwise deemed inadmissible. This runs counter to Canada's policy objectives with respect to the measured application of sanctions and restrictions on foreign nationals who are part of the Russian or Iranian regimes or who are key supporters of those regimes. Legislative amendments are required on an urgent basis to align the IRPA sanctions inadmissibility regime clearly with that of SEMA. That is why I am here today to introduce Bill S-8, an act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, which would, among other things, expressly align the IRPA with SEMA to ensure that all foreign nationals subject to sanctions under SEMA would be inadmissible to Canada. If passed, the current inadmissibility grounds relating to sanctions would be expanded to ensure that foreign nationals subject to sanctions, for any reason under SEMA, would be inadmissible to Canada. This would include foreign nationals sanctioned not only in Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Iran but also sanctioned individuals from Myanmar, South Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, Zimbabwe and North Korea. In addition, these amendments would also modernize the current sanction inadmissibility framework set out in IRPA. Allow me to explain the importance of this legislation and why I am seeking to pass it into law. The amendments of this bill would allow for all sanctions related to inadmissibility grounds to be treated in a cohesive and coherent manner; strengthen inadmissibility legislation that we already have in place rendering persons subject to sanctions inadmissible to Canada; ensure that the sanctions imposed by the Government of Canada would have direct consequences in terms of immigration and access to Canada; and allow Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada officials to deny temporary or permanent resident visas overseas and authorize Canada Border Services Agency officials to deny entry to and remove from Canada sanctioned individuals. Once enforced, these amendments would apply to all foreign nationals who are subject to sanctions issued unilaterally by Canada and to their immediate family members. These changes would ensure that all Russian and Iranian officials sanctioned under SEMA, and their sanctioned supporters, are inadmissible to Canada. Without the proposed amendments, those who are sanctioned in response to the situations in Ukraine and Iran are not necessarily inadmissible unless they have violated some other provision of IRPA. This proposed legislation would completely close that gap. This approach also aligns with and builds on recent strong legislative activity. For example, in the 2017 report by the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, entitled “A Coherent and Effective Approach to Canada's Sanctions Regimes: Sergei Magnitsky and Beyond”, the committee recommended that the IRPA be amended to designate all individuals sanctioned under SEMA as inadmissible to Canada. Subsequently, also in 2017, the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act, also known as the Sergei Magnitsky law or Bill S-226, came into force. This act created two new inadmissibility grounds, which aligned with certain sanctions, provisions related to international human rights violations, and significant corruption. Subsequent amendments to the IRPR were also made, so that delegated CBSA officers, as opposed to the immigration division of the Immigration and Refugee Board, were empowered to issue removal orders directly at ports of entry for individuals inadmissible pursuant to the newly created sanctions inadmissibility provisions. This ensured that these individuals would not have to be physically referred into Canada for admissibility hearings before the Immigration Division. Finally, budget 2018 provided the CBSA with the necessary funding to work with Global Affairs Canada and Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada to ensure that inadmissible sanctions cases are identified as early as possible in the travel continuum to prevent them from gaining access to our country. These investments and the effective work of border management and immigration officials in Canada and abroad support the proposed legislative amendments that I am seeking your support for today. Furthermore, while funding from budget 2018 ensured the proposed amendments were completed in a timely manner, the timeline of this proposal was adjusted to realign with border management and public safety priorities related to the necessary COVID-19 pandemic response. Nevertheless, proactive development of the amendments in Bill S-8 has enabled a timely legislative response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Iran's violent crackdown against civilian protesters. Further to the work already done, there are additional complementary and coordinating amendments introduced in this bill, which are required to align inadmissibility provisions with the sanctions provisions while maintaining the integrity of both frameworks. First, all the sanctions inadmissibility provisions will be treated in a cohesive and coherent manner. This includes, for instance, adding a temporal element to all the sanctions inadmissibility provisions, which means that a person is inadmissible only for as long as they remain on a sanctions list. In addition, as is the case today with IRPA, immediate family members of foreign nationals inadmissible for sanctions are also inadmissible. Similarly, existing provisions of IRPA with respect to immigration, detention and sanctioned individuals would apply to the new sanctioned grounds. Second, further legislative amendments in this bill would ensure that the inadmissibility framework related to multilateral sanctions, such as sanctions issued in concert with the United Nations, would be expanded to include groups or non-state entities, as opposed to only when states are sanctioned, as is the case today. Currently, sanctions issued against groups and non-state entities, such as al Qaeda or ISIL, do not automatically trigger sanctions-related inadmissibility ground. The proposed amendments would further facilitate interdiction and enforcement for sanctions issued multilaterally. Make no mistake, the proposed amendments would improve Canada's ability to identify and stop sanctioned foreign nationals before they can get to Canada. In the event that some do nevertheless arrive at our borders, delegated CBSA officers would have the authority to issue removal orders immediately at ports of entry for all those inadmissible for sanctions. It is important to note that sanctions inadmissibility is the most efficient and effective mechanism to swiftly identify inadmissible persons as early as possible in the travel continuum and to deny their ability to acquire a visa to Canada. While other inadmissibility provisions may be applicable to some sanctioned individuals, it should not be assumed that all sanctioned individuals are also inadmissible for other grounds. Moreover, other potentially relevant inadmissibility grounds, such as those relating to engaging in war crimes, require extensive investigation, case-by-case analysis, and hearings before the Immigration and Refugee Board before they can be applied and yield consequences. It is not expected to be the case that all individuals who are sanctioned can in fact also be found inadmissible for some other ground under IRPA. Unless there is a clear and specific ground for inadmissibility in IRPA against given individuals, immigration and border officers do not have the discretion to deny access to Canada. These amendments are therefore vital to ensuring consistent alignment between inadmissibility and sanctions. Bill S-8 will also support other inadmissibility and immigration enforcement measures being pursued with respect to Iran. Additional measures against the Iranian regime were announced on October 7. The Prime Minister announced that the Government of Canada would be seeking to designate the Iranian regime under IRPA. This means that in addition to the individual sanctions, the top 50% of the most senior echelons and the members of the Iranian regime most responsible for egregious serial human rights violations will be considered inadmissible to Canada once the regime has been designated, and indeed that has been done. Other refinements are included in the proposed amendments in Bill S-8. For instance, we will correct an inconsistency with respect to refugee policy that was created through Bill S-226. The Sergei Magnitsky law rendered inadmissible foreign nationals ineligible to make a refugee claim. However, multilateral sanctions such as those issued under the United Nations Act do not have the same consequence in IRPA. Similarly, the Refugee Convention itself does not identify sanctions in and of themselves as sufficient to warrant exclusion from refugee protection. The proposed amendments in this bill would correct that asymmetry and ensure that foreign nationals are not ineligible to have a refugee claim referred to the refugee protection division of the Immigration and Refugee Board on account of being inadmissible solely due to sanctions in line with Canada's international obligations. Given the measures in place to deny sanctioned individuals access to our borders, in the rare case in which an individual can apply for refugee protection in Canada, all foreign nationals inadmissible due to sanctions who are granted refugee or protected person status would not be eligible to become permanent residents while those sanctions are in place. This is a balanced yet firm approach. In addition, should a person inadmissible due to sanctions be subject to removal proceedings, they would be eligible to apply for a preremoval risk assessment, ensuring a fair assessment of risks facing them upon removal from Canada. In recognition of sanctions being a deliberate statement of government policy, further amendments are proposed to narrow the available pathways to overcome inadmissibility for sanctions within IRPA. I believe that lifting of the sanction in and of itself is the mechanism by which the consequences of a sanction should be avoided. As such, the bill proposes to remove access to ministerial relief for individuals who are inadmissible for sanctions. Furthermore, individuals inadmissible for sanctions would not have access to an appeal of the inadmissibility decision before the immigration appeal division, nor may they make an application for permanent residence on humanitarian and compassionate grounds, under our proposed amendments. Any request for recourse related to sanctions ought to be made to the sanctions-issuing body. For example, individuals inadmissible due to sanctions imposed by Canada could submit an application for delisting to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In addition, as with all decisions under IRPA, the federal court will continue to have jurisdiction to conduct judicial review of inadmissibility determinations on the basis of sanctions. The bill also includes coordinating amendments to the Emergencies Act and the Citizenship Act to maintain and clarify existing authorities related to sanctions inadmissibility in those pieces of legislation. Now more than ever, we must move to align the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act sanctions regime with the regime under the Special Economic Measures Act. The senators have agreed to adopt the motion and, to quote Senator Omidvar, have marked this bill as “super urgent”. I urge members to review Bill S-8 with the same sense of urgency. The bill will provide Canada with much-needed authorities to better link government sanctions, as well as the authorities necessary for our immigration officials to deny access to Canada. It will also better enable us to contribute to concerted action with our international partners. The bill we are introducing in the House today is a prudent and comprehensive approach that would allow our government to respond to the Russian and Iranian regimes' aggression with appropriate immigration consequences. This legislation and these amendments would provide a clear and strong message that the Government of Canada's comprehensive sanctions framework has meaningful and direct consequences, not only from an economic perspective, but from an immigration and access to Canada perspective as well. Doing so would allow us to stand up for human rights both here and abroad.
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  • Dec/12/22 1:31:26 p.m.
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  • Re: Bill S-8 
Mr. Speaker, it is always a great honour to stand in this place to speak on behalf of the residents and constituents of Edmonton Strathcona. I am particularly delighted to stand today to speak about our sanctions regime and the work that needs to be done to strengthen it and ensure it is as adequate and as strong as it can be. We know that sanctions are one of the tools we have to hold governments and individuals around the world to the rule of law, to human rights, to democracy and to fairness and justice for their citizens. For a very long time, many members in this place have worked very hard and well together to try to increase the effectiveness of our sanctions regime and the ability of sanctions to do what we hope they will do, which is to change the course of governments and individuals, to change their behaviour and punish them for the harms they have caused without harming and punishing innocent people and citizens. The act we are debating today is Bill S-8. This act would amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, to make consequential amendments to other acts and to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations. The proposed legislation amends the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, or the IRPA, and it provides Canada with much-needed abilities to better link government sanctions with authorities related to immigration enforcement. I think we can all agree that this means that not only will foreign nationals sanctioned due to the invasion of Ukraine be inadmissible to Canada, but it will also stop all previously sanctioned individuals from places like Iran, Myanmar or Burma, South Sudan, Syria, Venezuela and Zimbabwe among others. I and the NDP are very supportive of the bill, but we need to consider, and most of my comments today will be on this, that this is a small piece of what needs to be done to strengthen Canada's sanctions regime. The bill would not fix some of the things for which we have been calling for some time; for example, the absence of parliamentary oversight. We have very little parliamentary oversight of our sanctions regime, and I will speak to that a bit later. This would also not fix the enforcement in areas that are not immigration related, for example, the seizure of assets. Again, I will speak to this in more depth later on, but I would raise again in the House that to date about $121 million has been seized from Russian oligarchs as part of our sanctions regime to force Russia to stop its illegal war in Ukraine. While that $121 million is an awful lot to me and probably an awful lot to most of us in this room and in the country, it is not an awful lot for Russian oligarchs. The bill would also not fix the challenge that we as parliamentarians have with clarity. We still do not have a good system in this place that explains why the government chooses to add some people to the list to be sanctioned, how those decisions are made and how the timing of those decisions is determined. We know we work with our allies and other countries. That is very important for sanctions to be effective. However, as parliamentarians, we need to have more clarity on how those decisions are made. As we go forward in looking at strengthening the sanctions regime, there are people in the House who have been doing very important work on this. I have to call out my colleague from the Conservative Party, the member for Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, for his excellent work on the Magnitsky sanctions. The Deputy Prime Minister also did great work on ensuring the Magnitsky act was put in place. Of course, as some people have mentioned before, and my colleague from the Bloc mentioned just previously, the challenge is that putting a law in place does not actually matter if we do not enforce it or if we do not ensure it is adequately applied. A perfect example of this is that with the Magnitsky sanctions, we are supposed to do a five-year review. Five years is 2022. There is some review being done in the Senate, but we have not done any review within the foreign affairs committee or within this Parliament. For me, that is the challenge we have. I spoke briefly about the need to strengthen our sanctions regime. For years, the NDP has been pushing for a stronger sanctions regime. We are happy to see some of the important changes that this bill would bring forward, but there are things we have been asking for for years, including in the 2017 foreign affairs committee study on Canada's sanctions regime. Many of the recommendations from that study have not been implemented. We look forward to the government moving somewhat faster than it has to date to make sure those are implemented, especially considering that right now what we are seeing in Ukraine is a vital need for sanctions to be a key piece of our response to the Ukrainian war. Another example of why our sanctions regime has not been as effective as it could be is the waiver. We saw the government in the summer, in the middle of July, put a waiver in place that would cancel some of the important sanctions we put in place against Russia. I am not going to stand here and pretend that would not have been a very difficult decision for the government to make. Our German allies and Ukrainian allies were asking for different things, and that is a very difficult situation to be in. While I did not agree with the decision that was made by the government, I do accept it was a difficult decision to make. That said, first of all, the pipeline the waiver was supporting was a piece of equipment returned to Germany to be returned to Russia, and Russia did not pick it up. The second thing is that the pipeline it was meant to be used on has now been blown up. There is no reason whatsoever for us to still have this waiver in place and still have this lessening of our sanctions against Russia, yet we still do. The Government of Canada has still not cancelled the waiver, which is appalling. It is something it should be doing immediately. I know the foreign affairs committee will be recommending that, if we can get out of the filibuster that has been put in place by some of our colleagues in the Conservative Party. The other piece of our sanctions regime that I want to know about is how we can double-check it to see that what is happening is adequate and being done properly. I have talked a bit about sanctions oversight, and we know that after Russia invaded Ukraine in February, sanctions were put in place. However, we also know that those sanctions trickled out after months and months. We learned that many oligarchs had the opportunity to move their assets from Canada so they would not have those assets seized. That is a missed opportunity since those assets were supposed to help rebuild Ukraine and help with the rebuilding initiatives. We also know that the government has failed to provide the clarity on sanctions that we have hoped for. For example, I have asked about this multiple times in the House and through Order Paper questions to get more information and details on who is being sanctioned, what is being sanctioned, what has been seized, how it is being seized and what processes are being used. However, I have never been able to get an adequate answer from the government. In fact, one of the Order Paper questions was returned to me with a response that said the government was not 100% sure that it would be able to give me accurate information, so it provided me with no information at all. That is an interesting tactic. I would love to see somebody try to say in a high school or university course that since they are not sure they are giving all the information, they will give none at all. That is something we have problems with. We still do not have that level of clarity. I have another concern. When the government introduced the last budget implementation act, there was a change to the way that sanctions were dealt with. In the past, there was parliamentary oversight because the government needed to record the use of the sanctions regime or the sanctions act and needed to report it to Parliament. It needed to be tabled with Parliament. In the Budget Implementation Act, that requirement was removed. Therefore, it is now no longer the government's obligation to tell Parliament what those sanctions are or what has been seized. We could find out if we took the government to court and used a judicial remedy, but we cannot find out just through parliamentary processes. This is taking away the right of all parliamentarians to have that transparency and to have that understanding of how our sanctions are being chosen, how they are being enforced and if they are working. A sanction is not that useful if it is not being enforced. A sanction is not that important if countries or individuals understand that it will not be enforced in Canada. There is an interesting thing I found out as I was doing some digging around sanctions. If we want to find out what goods are coming into Canada from Russia, we can look at Russian shipping records. We cannot find that out by looking at Canadian shipping records. It is very interesting to me that there is transparency that can be found in the U.S., the U.K., the EU and Russia, but we cannot find it here. That is another challenge I have with our sanction regime. As I said at the beginning, this particular bill would help with some aspects of our sanction regime. I am very happy to support this legislation. I am very happy to see that it would be fixing some of those holes around our sanction regime. However, this seems very much, to me, like tinkering around the edges. We have heard from the Senate. One of the key quotations from the Senate hearings on Bill S-8, from Canada's foremost expert on sanctions policy, Andrea Charron, was this: While there is nothing wrong with highlighting in the Immigration and Refugee Act that inadmissibility due to sanctions is possible, this repeats a pattern whereby Canada tinkers on the margins of legislation without addressing core policy and process issues. If we are to continue to sanction autonomously with allies, we need to fix fundamental issues of policy and [fundamental issues of] process. I believe that we have many things we still need to do. We need to have a comprehensive review of Canada's sanction regime. The NDP has proposed a study at the foreign affairs committee on Canada's sanction regime. That study was meant to have taken place during this fall's session. We are very hopeful that it will take place very quickly once the winter session begins. I urge my colleagues in the Conservative Party to stop filibustering our committee so that we can get on with the very important work of foreign affairs. We can ensure that our sanctions are being more effectively applied. We can bring forward legislation that would align with the recommendations in the 2017 foreign affairs committee report that called for greater transparency. It called for a review of our sanctions regime and called for a parliamentary body of all parties that would assist in identifying which names and which individuals should be on the Magnitsky list and should be sanctioned by the Government of Canada. One of our biggest problems, and I have said this many times, is that if we cannot fix our sanction regime, our sanction regime very quickly becomes not as effective and not as useful as we need it to be. I think that members of the House have brought up circumstances where that is the case. We know that, for example, in Ukraine, sanctions are one of the key tools we have to hold Russia to account for its illegal invasion in Ukraine. It is one of the key levers that Canada can pull to force the Russian Federation to rethink this horrific and illegal attack on civilians. It is also one of the things that we can use when other human rights abuses are raised around the world. We are seeing horrific attacks on protesters in Iran. Just this morning, I woke up to another horrific example of a protester being executed because he was fighting for his freedom. We know that there are many Iranians who are in grave danger right now. If this sanction regime can be fixed and can help the people in Iran even a little bit, it has to be done. I am interested in looking at sanctioning a whole range of characters around the world who we know have been responsible for atrocious human rights abuses, such as what we see in Yemen and from members of Saudi Arabia. We need to be ensuring that, as a country, we are standing up for human rights, using the tools we have at our disposal for those efforts. I also want to point out that the sanctions regime is a tool we also have to use for our feminist international assistance policy and for the feminist foreign policy that we certainly hope the government tables in Parliament very soon. We know that a huge percentage of the people who are identified by the Magnitsky sanctions and the other SEMA sanction measures are perpetrating human rights abuses that are disproportionately impacting women and girls around the world. We know that sexual violence and gender-based violence have been used as a tool to silence journalists and human rights defenders around the world. We know that rape has been used. This violence does not align with a country like Canada, which has a feminist foreign policy and a feminist international assistance policy, and we need to be looking at our foreign responses through that lens. I would like to end my comments with this. As I was travelling here from Edmonton yesterday, I took some time to read some of the speeches from the Nobel Peace Prize winners, and I want to read a quote to the House. It is by Oleksandra Matviichuk from the Center for Civil Liberties, the 2022 Nobel Peace Prize winner. She spoke to me about the need for sanctions and why it was so important that we work with our allies to make our sanctions regime stronger. She stated: Peace, progress and human rights are inextricably linked. A state that kills journalists, imprisons activists, or disperses peaceful demonstrations poses a threat not only to its citizens. Such a state poses a threat to the entire region and peace in the world as a whole. Therefore, the world must adequately respond to systemic violations. In political decision-making, human rights must be as important as economic benefits or security. This approach {must} be applied in foreign policy...
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  • Dec/12/22 1:54:19 p.m.
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  • Re: Bill S-8 
Mr. Speaker, unfortunately, I was not a member in 2017, so I was not part of the foreign affairs committee at that time. I was not elected until 2019. However, my colleague Hélène Laverdière, who sat on the committee at the time, was an extremely vocal advocate for the sanction regime. She did an awful lot of work bringing forward the recommendations. While I am happy that debate happened in the House, one of the recommendations was that there would be a five-year review, and we are almost at the end of five years. While the parliamentary secretary is interested in getting this bill passed by the end of this week, just as we all are, by the end of this week we also lose the opportunity for the five-year review for the sanction regime, something that has not happened. I hope at the very beginning of 2023, when we all come back refreshed and full of energy, we will be looking at our sanction regime.
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  • Dec/12/22 1:56:46 p.m.
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  • Re: Bill S-8 
Mr. Speaker, the member perhaps did not listen to my speech and does not know that we were debating Bill S-8 today, which is about sanctions, our sanction regime and how to strengthen our sanction regime. It is not really about my Christmas wish list, although I will say that dental care, pharmacare and sick days for workers are super important to me, and I am glad that she brought them up.
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