House Hansard - 157

44th Parl. 1st Sess.

February 9, 2023 10:00AM

Feb/9/23 12:38:31 p.m.
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Madam Speaker, throughout this historical overview, I hope to bring out two main points. The first point is who used the notwithstanding clause in a particular political and historical context. The use of the clause was exceptional until very recently, in the case of Ontario, where it was used pre-emptively. The political cost was simply too high to do otherwise. The second point is that the frequent practice of provincial legislatures was to invoke the notwithstanding clause in response to a court decision. In my opinion, the only potentially legitimate recourse to section 33 necessarily involves the courts. Our constitutional tradition is marked by dialogue. The pre-emptive recourse to the derogatory clause eliminating legal debate is contrary to our traditions and must be decried. The legislature of Quebec, for a time, included a standard notwithstanding provision in each of its new laws; this practice continued until the 1995 election. Afterwards, the notwithstanding clause was used only a few times by the provincial legislatures. The Saskatchewan legislature passed back-to-work legislation invoking the notwithstanding clause in the mid-1980s. The legislature did this in response to a decision by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal that declared an earlier version of the law unconstitutional and did not include an overriding provision. The Supreme Court eventually cited the Saskatchewan legislature, ultimately concluding that the law did not infringe on the charter. Therefore, the recourse derogation clause was not necessary in this case. The third province to use the notwithstanding clause was Alberta. In 2000, the Alberta legislation passed the Marriage Amendment Act, 2000. With this act, the province's Marriage Act was amended to declare that a marriage could only be between persons of opposite sexes. Apart from the initial and particular example of Quebec immediately after the patriation of the Constitution in 1982, it can be seen that recourse to the notwithstanding clause was relatively exceptional. Prior to 2018, only three provinces had laws in effect invoking the notwithstanding clause, and they did so only a few times. Since 2018, we note a renewed interest in the use of this clause. The Ontario legislature almost invoked the notwithstanding clause in 2018 in response to the Ontario Superior Court decision that a law to reduce the size of the City of Toronto's council was unconstitutional. Legislation invoking the notwithstanding clause was not passed, however, because of the intervention of the Ontario Court of Appeal. Subsequently, the Ontario legislature passed, for the first time, legislation invoking the notwithstanding clause in the Protecting Elections and Defending Democracy Act, 2021. The notwithstanding provision was invoked here in response to the decision of the Ontario Superior Court, which declared certain provisions relating to third party election expenses unconstitutional. This new bill from the Legislative Assembly of Ontario therefore follows a worrying recent trend. As I mentioned, while the use of the derogation clause was exceptional then, this seems to be less and less the case now. One could add to these examples the failed attempt by the New Brunswick legislature in 2019. This provision should not be taken lightly. There was never any question when it was included in the charter that it should become a tool to be used routinely. Rather, it should only be used in the most pressing cases where no other option could be considered and there is a strong public policy consideration. What is the point of adopting a charter incorporating fundamental rights and values into our Constitution only to derogate from it at the slightest inconvenience? A healthy democracy should not be based on majority rule. It must respect and protect all Canadians by giving them the chance to question the decisions of the government in place. The charter is an instrument for challenging decisions made by governments by applying clear guidelines. It is not normal for a government to be able to make decisions without submitting to scrupulous evaluation by its population. However, this is what section 33 is for: to avoid any debate and exchange of ideas about a measure. This is a way for a government to hide behind the notwithstanding clause in order to avoid questioning itself. I do not think that allows us to live in a healthy democracy. In addition, the time of use of the notwithstanding clause should also be considered. Indeed, when used pre-emptively and preventatively, it has even more negative repercussions on our parliamentary system since governments can pass laws without worrying about the impact on the fundamental rights of their citizens. Its preventive use risks upsetting the fragile balance that exists between the protection of fundamental rights and the effective functioning of a parliamentary system. I would like to conclude by saying that I take a dim view of this frequent pre-emptive use of the derogation clause. This practice trivializes our most basic protections, and I am happy that we have the opportunity to discuss this important matter for all Canadians across this country.

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House Hansard - 157