44th Parl. 1st Sess.

May 4, 2023 10:00AM

Mr. Brad Vis (Mission—Matsqui—Fraser Canyon, CPC)

May/4/23 1:52:23 p.m.
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Mr. Speaker, some of the points I was going to make in my speech were just covered by the member from Kamloops. With respect to the debate we just had, the point is that during the debate this morning the member for Kingston and the Islands, the member for Vancouver Granville and the member for Winnipeg North all alluded to the fact that it was the member for Wellington—Halton Hills who knew and did nothing. That is a form of victim abuse. That is not acceptable for this House and it pains me to see members of the government, parliamentary secretaries, building a narrative to discredit an hon. member of this chamber. It has to stop and they need to apologize today. The government is defensive. It is defensive for a very good reason. It goes back to the 2020 report of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians covering their actions in 2019. Of particular interest is chapter 2 of this report, the government's response to foreign interference, which notes, I will add, that Canada's allies have identified interference as a significant threat and initiated various countermeasures. It reads,“foreign interference in Canada has received minimal media and academic coverage, and is not part of wider public discourse.” Things have changed since 2020. In their review of foreign interference activities, this non-partisan committee, which only issues reports if every member of the said committee agrees to them, had a number of findings. They read: F8. Some foreign states conduct sophisticated and pervasive foreign interference activities against Canada. Those activities pose a significant risk to national security, principally by undermining Canada's fundamental institutions and eroding the rights and freedoms of Canadians. (Paragraphs 136-175) F9. CSIS has consistently conducted investigations and provided advice to government on foreign interference. (Paragraphs 195-201) F10. Throughout the period under review, the interdepartmental coordination and collaboration on foreign interference was case-specific and ad hoc. Canada's ability to address foreign interference is limited by the absence of a holistic approach to consider relevant risks, appropriate tools and possible implications of responses to state behaviours. (Paragraphs 219-227 and 280-285) F11. Foreign interference has received historically less attention in Canada than other national security threats. This is beginning to change with the government's nascent focus on "hostile state activities." Nonetheless, the security and intelligence community's approach to addressing the threat is still marked by a number of conditions: There are significant differences in how individual security and intelligence organizations interpret the gravity and prevalence of the threat, and prioritize their resources. (Paragraphs 276-279) In determining the measures the government may use to address instances of foreign interference, responses address specific activities and not patterns of behaviour. F12. Government engagement on foreign interference has been limited. With the exception of CSIS outreach activities, the government's interaction with subnational levels of government and civil society on foreign interference is minimal. (Paragraphs 256-267) Engagement is limited in part by the lack of security-cleared individuals at the subnational level. (Paragraph 261) There is no public foreign interference strategy or public report similar to those developed for terrorism or cyber security. (Paragraphs 289-291) I could go on but my time is limited today. The committee made a number of recommendations on actions that the government could take to combat foreign interference, and yet none of those have been taken today. We have still not seen a foreign registry tabled in this Parliament and we have still not seen real action by the government. The only reason we are seeing any action today is because of Robert Fife in The Globe and Mail. Recommendation five in the committee's report reads: R5. The Government of Canada develop a comprehensive strategy to counter foreign interference and build institutional and public resiliency. Drawing from the Committee's review and findings, such a strategy should: a. identify the short- and long-term risks and harms to Canadian institutions and rights and freedoms posed by the threat of foreign interference; b. examine and address the full range of institutional vulnerabilities targeted by hostile foreign states, including areas expressly omitted in the Committee's review; c. assess the adequacy of existing legislation that deals with foreign interference, such as the Security of Information Act or the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, and make proposals for changes if required; d. develop practical, whole-of-government operational and policy mechanisms to identify and respond to the activities of hostile states; e. establish regular mechanisms to work with sub-national levels of government... f. include an approach for ministers and senior officials to engage with fundamental institutions and the public; and g. guide cooperation with allies on foreign interference. The next point is that the Government of Canada “support this comprehensive strategy through sustained central leadership” and review of legislation. To conclude, the government has done nothing outlined in the 2020 report. The only reason we are here today and the only reason the Conservative Party has brought this motion forward is to establish a foreign agent registry, to establish a national public inquiry, and to close down the People's Republic of China's police offices in Canada. What is happening to our sovereignty? I will state this emotional appeal.

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House Hansard - 191