44th Parl. 1st Sess.
June 12, 2024 02:00PM
Madam Speaker, it was a long slog through committee last week with Bill C-70, and ultimately this legislation is needed. We need to bring up to speed our analog laws so that they can thrive in a digital era.
My question to my hon. colleague is this: The National Council of Canadian Muslims is publicly releasing a concerning statement about the definition of “intimidation” in the Security of Information Act amendments in the bill. I am just wondering if the parliamentary secretary could reply here on the floor of the House to those concerns from NCCM.
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- Jun/12/24 4:38:29 p.m.
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Madam Speaker, as I said in my speech, and I thank my hon. colleague for raising this, the balance that this legislation needs, not only in updating the tools for CSIS but also in creating those safeguards, is absolutely crucial. That is something we heard in testimony on this legislation at committee. I want to assure Canadians that these amendments are to apply to national security threats and risks, but in addition to that, we have ensured that the CSIS Act would, for the first time ever, have a five-year review so that parliamentarians and all Canadians can be part of this debate to ensure that the balance between national security and the protection of Canadians' rights and freedoms here in this country are paramount.
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Madam Speaker, now that Bill C-70 is back in the House for third reading, I would like to take this opportunity to outline the long journey it took to get to this point.
In 2018, the director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, David Vigneault, advised the government about threats presented by the People's Republic of China. That year, he warned the Prime Minister that PRC activities related to the threat of foreign interference were an existential threat for Parliament and the elections.
Also in 2018, the government was advised that the measures then in place were not sufficient to counter these threats to Parliament and to our elections. We know that because it was the second finding of fact on page 73 of the NSICOP report.
Also back in 2018, national security agencies advised the government to introduce a range of measures to counter these threats, including new legislation.
It is also notable that in 2018, the CSIS director also advised the government of another threat from the PRC, which was the threat of espionage. We know that because, for the first time ever, the director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service gave a public speech in December of that year. In that speech, he warned of serious threats from the PRC closely related to foreign interference, which were those of espionage. These threats came in the form of espionage targeting Canadian companies and Canadian universities in the five sensitive areas he outlined at that time: artificial intelligence, quantum computing, 5G telecommunications technology, biopharma and clean tech.
Subsequently, in 2019, the Clerk of the Privy Council sought the Prime Minister's approval for an action plan to protect Parliament and our elections. The Prime Minister did not approve that plan.
Again, a year later, in December 2020, the national security and intelligence adviser to the Prime Minister sought the Prime Minister's approval again for that action plan to protect Parliament and our elections. Again, the Prime Minister did not approve the plan.
For the third time, in February 2022, the national security and intelligence adviser resurrected this initiative, and again, the Prime Minister did not approve an action plan.
In all three occasions over several years, the Prime Minister did not approve actions that would have protected Parliament and our elections.
On November 18, 2020, the House adopted a motion calling on the government to produce a robust plan to counter foreign interference threat activities here on Canadian soil. Despite all of this advice, despite the call of the House of Commons to the government to enact a robust plan to counter foreign interference and to take additional measures to protect Canadian democracy, little was done.
Then, because the Prime Minister did not approve actions to protect Parliament and our elections, and because the government failed to heed the call of the House in the motion adopted on November 18, 2020, foreign interference threats increased from 2018 to present.
As Justice Hogue said in her initial report of May 3, the risk from the impacts of foreign interference will only increase as long as “sufficient protective measures to guard against it” are not taken.
Then, subsequent to all of this, in the fall of 2022, explosive media reports about foreign interference threats broke. These reports raised questions about what the Prime Minister knew, when he knew it and why he did not act on the intelligence and the advice he was given by the senior civil service. Further explosive revelations in the subsequent months followed in the media. Finally, on March 6, 2023, the government promised to look at introducing measures in law to counter these threats.
It took years for the government to take the advice of CSIS, the senior civil service and countless reports. It took years for the government to introduce legislation. Finally, after much urging, many controversies and a lot of work done by a great many people, the government reluctantly introduced Bill C‑70.
That brings us to the debate today on Bill C-70 at third reading. Bill C-70 is a much-needed response to the existential threat to our democracy from foreign interference. It would modernize the CSIS Act, allowing CSIS to better obtain preservation and production orders, and national security warrants for obtaining information, records or documents, through a single attempt. It would better allow CSIS to collect, retain and analyze data for intelligence purposes. It would allow CSIS to collect foreign intelligence and to disclose classified information outside of the Government of Canada to provinces, municipalities, universities, companies and individuals being targeted.
It would create new criminal offences for those who would engage in foreign interference here in Canada on behalf of a foreign state, ensuring that we could better protect Canadians against these corrosive, clandestine, corrupting and coercive activities, especially Canadians in diaspora communities who have suffered for so long in silence and isolation. It would also make it easier to prosecute these offences by removing the requirement to prove harm to the interests of Canada when a Canadian is targeted by foreign interference.
It would create a new criminal offence that would better protect essential infrastructure in Canada, including stiff penalties for those who would sabotage essential infrastructure on behalf of a foreign state or a foreign government. It would amend the Canada Evidence Act and would make consequential to other acts so that it would allow information relating to foreign affairs, national defence or national security in Federal Court proceedings to be better handled.
Finally, the bill would establish a foreign influence, transparency and accountability act, which would create a foreign influence registry and a new foreign influence transparency commissioner. The new foreign influence transparency commissioner would oversee a public registry containing information on individuals in Canada engaged in legitimate influence activities on behalf of a foreign principal.
The bill was strengthened in committee, particularly with respect to the appointment of a commissioner. The commissioner would be appointed by the Governor in Council after consultation with leaders in the House of Commons and in the Senate, and after resolutions in the House of Commons and in the Senate are adopted. This would ensure that while the commissioner is situated within the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, within the machinery of government, the commissioner would have a degree of independence to manage and to interpret the act, to issue notices of compliance, to issue administrative monetary penalties and to refer matters to law enforcement for criminal prosecution.
Time is of the essence. We must ensure that our democratic institutions and elections are protected from the threats of foreign interference. Inaction and delay cannot continue. As Justice Hogue noted in her initial report, the risk of the impacts from foreign interference will only increase as long as “sufficient protective measures to guard against it” are not taken. She also concluded that “foreign interference in the 2019 and 2021 [general] elections” undermined “public confidence in Canada's democracy”.
As the general election draws closer, time is running out to strengthen the confidence Canadians have in our elections. Time is running out to combat the rising threat of foreign interference. Canadians need to be able to go to the polls in the next election and to be confident not only in the integrity of the overall election but also in the integrity of each of the elections that take place in each of the 338 electoral districts in Canada. This bill must pass, and I encourage all of my parliamentary colleagues, in this place and in the other place, to support this bill and to see its adoption into law before we adjourn for the summer.
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- Jun/12/24 5:07:37 p.m.
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Madam Speaker, part of the NSICOP report's conclusions was that Canada is a “low-risk, high reward” place to operate in, so it is obvious that we need to meet this moment with these legislative safeguards.
I want to ask the member about the first part of the bill, the updates to the CSIS Act, because the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency came out with a pretty scathing review of how CSIS has handled its datasets, and we would do important upgrades here to bring what is essentially an analog law up to speed in a digital era.
Can the member talk about some of the safeguards that we would put into place with this legislation and the updates that we would put in place to make sure that CSIS is no longer violating the statute that it operates by?
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- Jun/12/24 5:08:26 p.m.
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Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague for the question and especially for his work, which he always does with openness and compassion.
It used to be that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS, acted alone and could not communicate with the other agencies. It acted alone and was its own master in a way. It ensured its own accountability.
I believe that sharing information with the other services will nonetheless contribute to limiting the actions of CSIS because it will not be alone in self-regulation. It will have to be accountable to the other agencies. I believe that simply sharing will contribute to improving the situation that, admittedly, relied on secrecy.
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- Jun/12/24 5:36:32 p.m.
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Madam Speaker, I thank my hon. colleague for her speech in the House and her insights on the bill.
I want to ask the member about the provision to have the CSIS Act regularly reviewed every five years. Given that the legislation is almost 41 years old, one thing I always found challenging was the fact that there had not been a significant review to keep pace not only with the changing threat nature of foreign interference but also with security and privacy issues all around.
Could the member comment on the ability to review this important legislation?
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