With regard to the Minister of Rural Economic Development’s announcement on improving connectivity in rural Saskatchewan made on March 17, 2023, since the announcement: (a) how much of the $37 million in announced funding has been spent to date; (b) what projects, if any, have received funding; and (c) have any of the Hanson Lake Road projects been approved for this funding, including (i) Hanson Lake Road A UBF-3500, (ii) Hanson Lake Road B UBF-3501, (iii) Hanson Lake Road C UBF-3502, (iv) Creighton UBF-3503, (v) Hanson Lake Road UBF-3506, (vi) other projects? With regard to the Canada Revenue Agency, broken down by tax year since 2019: (a) how many trusts and corporations assessed and paid capital gains and what was the total amount of capital gains collected from this group; (b) how many trusts and corporations assessed and paid taxes on capital gains (i) of less than $50,000, (ii) between $50,000 and $100,000, (iii) between $100,000 and $250,000, (iv) of more than $250,000; and (c) for each group in (b), what was the total amount collected in taxes on capital gains? With regard to the First Nations and Inuit Policing Program, and the Auditor General of Canada's report entitled "Report 3 - First Nations and Inuit Policing Program": (a) what is the breakdown of the $930 million in funding, referred to in paragraph 3.21 of the report, by province and territory; (b) how is the funding broken down by (i) self-administered police service agreements, (ii) Community Tripartite Agreements; (c) why, according to paragraph 3.23 of the report, didn’t Public Safety Canada disburse about $17 million of the $196 million program funds available in the 2022-23 fiscal year; and (d) why, according to paragraph 3.24 of the report, didn’t Public Safety Canada verify whether the funds transferred to the RCMP were being used for program costs, as opposed to other police services? With regard to the National Trade Corridors Fund administered by Transport Canada, as of April 2024: (a) of the projects funded, how many (i) have not started, (ii) are underway, (iii) have been completed; and (b) for each project, what is the (i) timeline, (ii) objective, (iii) location? With regard to government contracts with McKinsey & Company and the report from the Office of Procurement Ombud, entitled "Procurement Practice Review of Contracts Awarded to McKinsey & Company": (a) what are the details of the 25 non-competitive contracts listed on page four of the report, including, for each, (i) the date of the contract, (ii) the title, (iii) the file number, (iv) the value of each contract, (v) the department, (vi) the reason for sole sourcing, (vii) who authorized the sole sourcing, (viii) the purpose of the contract and services provided; (b) what are the details of the seven competitive contracts listed on page four of the report, including, for each, the (i) date of the contract, (ii) title, (iii) file number, (iv) value of the contract, (v) department, (vi) purpose of the contract and services provided; and (c) why did the government change their procurement strategy to allow two contracts to be awarded to McKinsey & Company when they were originally ineligible, in the instance outlined on page six, paragraph 26 of the report? With regard to government payments: how many recipients of (i) the Canada Pension Plan, (ii) Old Age Security, (iii) the Guaranteed Income Supplement, (iv) Canada Pension Plan disability benefits, (v) Employment Insurance benefits, (vi) the Child Tax benefit, (vii) Survivor’s Pension, received their payments, broken down by method of receival (e.g. direct deposit, physical cheque mailed by the government, etc.), by province or territory (or abroad, if applicable) and by year, since 2015? With regard to the number and value of contracts awarded to GC Strategies and Coredal Systems Consulting, from January 1, 2011, to February 16, 2024, that were provided by the Treasury Board Secretariat to the Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates on April 16, 2024: what are the details for each deliverable associated with the contracts, including, for each, the (i) date that the deliverable was finished, (ii) title, (iii) summary of the recommendations, (iv) file number, (v) website where the deliverable is available online, if applicable? With regard to the government's participation in the sixth session of the United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA-6) in Nairobi, Kenya: (a) what are the total expenditures incurred by the government to date related to the assembly, broken down by type of expense; (b) what was the total number of attendees that the government paid for, including the (i) official title and department or organization of each individual, (ii) total expenditures incurred for each entity in (i), broken down by type of expense; (c) for the delegation’s accommodations in Kenya, (i) what hotels were used, (ii) how much was spent at each hotel, (iii) how many rooms were rented at each hotel and for how many nights, (iv) what were the room rates paid at each hotel and the number of rooms rented at each rate, (v) who stayed in each of the rooms in (iv), broken down by room rate; (d) what were the details of the Minister of Environment and Climate Change’s accommodation expenditures, including the (i) daily rate, (ii) accommodating venue; (e) what are the details of the total hospitality expenditures, broken down by (i) date, (ii) amount, (iii) location, (iv) name of any commercial establishment or vendor involved in the hospitality activity, (v) number of attendees, (vi) the description of the event, (vii) the description of goods and services purchased; (f) what are the details of all ground transportation expenditures, including, for each, the (i) date, (ii) amount, (iii) vendor, (iv) point of origin, (v) destination, (vi) make and model of each vehicle used, (vii) type of vehicle (e.g. gas, electric, hybrid), (viii) whether a chauffeur or driver was included, (ix) names and titles of the passengers or individuals who incurred the expense; and (g) what are the details of all expenditures on gifts related to the assembly, including, for each, the (i) value, (ii) description, (iii) vendor from whom it was purchased, (iv) recipient? With regard to the Community Futures Program, since 2019: outside of core funding, what are the details of all additional funding which has been given to organizations which implement the program such as the Community Futures Development Corporations, including, for each instance, the (i) recipient, (ii) amount, (iii) date, (iv) purpose of the funding, (v) program under which the funding was provided? With regard to loans provided directly by regional development agencies under the Regional Relief and Recovery Fund: what are the details, including, for each, the (i) date, (ii) recipient, (iii) advanced loan value, (iv) location of the borrower, (v) amount still owing? With regard to the communities which comprise the federal electoral district of Courtenay—Alberni, since the 2005-06 fiscal year: (a) what are the federal housing investments, including direct transfers to the municipalities and First Nations, for the communities of (i) Tofino, (ii) Ucluelet, (iii) Port Alberni, (iv) Parksville, (v) Qualicum Beach, (vi) Cumberland, (vii) Courtenay, (viii) Deep Bay, (ix) Dashwood, (x) Royston, (xi) French Creek, (xii) Errington, (xiii) Coombs, (xiv) Nanoose Bay, (xv) Cherry Creek, (xvi) China Creek, (xvii) Bamfield, (xviii) Beaver Creek, (xix) Beaufort Range, (xx) Millstream, (xxi) Mt. Washington Ski Resort, broken down by fiscal year, total expenditure, and project; (b) what are the federal housing investments transferred to the (i) Comox Valley, (ii) Nanaimo, (iii) Alberni-Clayoquot, (iv) Powell River, Regional Districts, broken down by fiscal year, total expenditure, and project; and (c) what are the federal housing investments transferred to the Island Trusts of (i) Hornby Island, (ii) Denman Island, (iii) Lasquetti Island, broken down by fiscal year, and total expenditure? With regard to duty of care of athletes and athlete accidents, injuries, concussions, eating disorders and mental health challenges: (a) does Canada have a duty of care to carded athletes, and, if so, what is the policy; (b) do (i) coaches, (ii) medical personnel, (iii) other individuals on an athlete’s team, have a duty of care to carded athletes, and, if so, what is the policy; (c) do any of the provinces and territories recognize a duty of care to (i) young people participating in organized sport in school, (ii) athletes and young people participating in organized sport outside of school, and, if so, which provinces and territories, and what are their respective policies; (d) does Canada have a duty to report any abuse of athletes, and, if so, what are the details, including, (i) is it immediate, (ii) is it direct, (iii) is it ongoing, (iv) does it address confidentiality, (v) does it require documenting action, (vi) what is the policy; (e) do any of the provinces and territories have a duty to report any abuse of children participating in organized sport in school, and, if so, what are the details, including (i) is it immediate, (ii) is it direct, (iii) is it ongoing, (iv) does it address confidentiality, (v) does it require documenting action, (vi) what are any policies; (f) do any of the provinces and territories have a duty to report any abuse of athletes and young people participating in organized sport outside of school, and, if so, what are the details, including (i) is it immediate, (ii) is it direct, (iii) is it ongoing, (iv) does it address confidentiality, (v) does it require documenting action, (vi) what are any policies; (g) does a registry of athlete accidents and injuries in Canada, for carded athletes, exist, and, if so, what are the details, including, (i) the physical and mental health injuries being tracked, (ii) the period for which injuries are tracked, (iii) the number of injuries, broken down by sport, (iv) the time lost from training, (v) the time lost from education, (vi) the time lost from work, (vii) the treatments required, (viii) whether the full cost of necessary treatment is covered, and by whom, (ix) any cost to the athlete for treatment, (x) long-term health impacts, if any; (h) do registries of athlete accidents and injuries in Canada exist at the provincial or territorial level, and, if so, what are the details, including, the (i) physical and mental health injuries being tracked, (ii) period for which injuries are tracked, (iii) number of injuries, broken down by sport, (iv) time lost from training, (v) time lost from education, (vi) time lost from work, (vii) treatments required, (viii) long-term health impacts, if any; (i) have any sport deaths occurred in Canada, and, if so, what are the details, including, (i) the number of deaths, (ii) the year, (iii) the sport, (iv) the cause of death, (v) was there an investigation, (vi) were there recommendations to prevent similar accidents in the future; (j) have any sport paralysis cases occurred in Canada, and, if so, what are the details, including, (i) the number of cases, (ii) the year, (iii) the sport, (iv) the cause of paralysis, (v) was there an investigation, (vi) were there recommendations to prevent similar accidents in the future; (k) have any severe brain injury cases occurred in Canada because of sport, and, if so, what are the details, including, (i) the number of cases, (ii) the year, (iii) the sport, (iv) the cause of the brain injury, (v) was there an investigation, (vi) were there recommendations to prevent a similar accident in the future, (vii) were there long-term health impacts, and, if so, what were they; (l) does a registry of concussions for carded athletes exist, and, if so, what are the details, including, (i) the concussion rate among carded athletes, broken down by sport, (ii) whether the concussion rate is increasing or decreasing, broken down by sport, (iii) in which sports are concussions most prevalent; (m) how is “safe” defined with respect to head injuries; (n) are head injury protocols designed to be safe, broken down by sport; (o) how is “reasonable action” defined with respect to head injuries; (p) what National Sport Organizations (NSOs) take reasonable action to protect athletes from permanent injury caused by repetitive concussive and sub-concussive blows; (q) which, if any, NSOs have a policy regarding subclinical hits; (r) which, if any, NSOs have a policy regarding (i) head injury education, (ii) prevention of head injury, (iii) injury assessment, (iv) injury management; (s) do preventive head injury protocols exist, and, if so, what are the details, including (i) the sport, (ii) the protocol, (iii) how it reflects the best available science; (t) what, if any, certification, and training is required of (i) coaches, (ii) trainers, (iii) members of an athlete’s team, regarding mental health; (u) what, if any, work is being done to look at the mental health of carded athletes, including, but not limited to, (i) the creation of safe spaces, (ii) the consideration of stress, anxiety and depression, (iii) the consideration of cumulative impacts of injury, overtraining and uncertain futures, (iv), support before, during and after major competitions, (v) recognition of athletes’ efforts; (v) what, if any, certification and training is required of (i) coaches, (ii) trainers, (iii) members of an athlete’s team, on physical development, including basic needs, cognitive development, social development, risk, and resilience; and (w) is any tracking done regarding disordered eating rates among carded athletes, and, if so, what are the details, including (i) the rates, broken down by sport, (ii) whether eating disorders are increasing or decreasing, (iii) what, if any, work is being done regarding power dynamics and culture of dietary practices, (iv) who has the medical training to provide nutritional advice, (v) what, if any, work is being done regarding body shaming, (vi) what, if any, work is being done regarding reducing stigma?

Is it agreed? Some hon. members: Agreed.

Madam Speaker, if the government's responses to Questions Nos. 2584 to 2589, 2591 to 2595 and 2598 could be made orders for return, these returns would be tabled immediately in an electronic format.

With regard to Health Canada (HC), the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC), the National Advisory Committee on Immunization (NACI) and any communications in 2020 or 2021 regarding mask exemptions, COVID-19 vaccines, medications to treat COVID-19, or any other public health messaging about COVID-19: (a) did (i) the Minister of Health, (ii) the Deputy Minister of Health, Dr. Steven Lucas, (iii) the Chief Public Health Officer, (iv) the Deputy Chief Public Health Officer, (v) the Chief Medical Officer at Health Canada, (vi) any personnel from HC, (vii) any personnel from the PHAC, (viii) any personnel from the NACI, (ix) any firm contracted by or through HC, PHAC, or NACI, communicate or correspond, directly or indirectly, with the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (CPSO); (b) if any of the answers to (a)(i) through (a)(ix) are affirmative, (i) when did these communications occur, (ii) what are the summaries of those communications; (c) did any of the individuals or agencies in (a)(i) through (a)(ix) of (a) communicate with the Health Professions Regulatory Advisory Council (HPRAC); and (d) if the answer to (c) is affirmative, what are the summaries of those communications? With regard to the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB): (a) what are the details of all advertisement campaigns by the CPPIB since November 4, 2015, including, for each, the (i) title, (ii) name of the advertising campaign, (iii) objective, (iv) total costs associated with the advertisement campaign, (v) breakdown of the costs; and (b) for each advertisement campaign in (a), was it (i) website based, (ii) paper based, (iii) radio based, (iv) television based? With regard to Site 06875001 – Camp Bouchard, Ex Ammo Dump, on the Federal Contaminated Sites Inventory: (a) what measures are currently underway to decontaminate the site; (b) what is the plan and timeline to decontaminate the site; and (c) what amounts have been allocated to decontaminate the site? With regard to the Canada Border Services Agency’s (CBSA) decision to have Employment Professionals Canada (EPC) as their permitted offload and reload service provider: (a) what are the details of the arrangement between the CBSA and EPC that requires truckers to use EPC’s services during examination, including (i) when the agreement was signed, (ii) what the terms of the agreement (financial and otherwise) are, (iii) who at the CBSA authorized the agreement; (b) is the CBSA aware of the reports alleging that EPC is engaging in price gouging and charging some truckers thousands of dollars for re-loading services that were previously available to truckers, and, if so, what was the CBSA’s reaction to these reports; (c) is the government concerned that the increased costs to truckers resulting from the use of EPC’s services will be passed on to consumers, and, if so, what action will be taken in response; (d) does EPC provide the offloading and reloading services itself in all cases, or does it subcontract these services to other parties; (e) if EPC’s services are subcontracted to other firms, why did the CBSA decide to pay a middleman rather than directly paying the vendor who provides the loading and offloading services; (f) does the CBSA pay EPC to be the provider or does EPC pay the CBSA for the right to be the exclusive supplier, and how much is being paid; (g) what measures, if any, has the CBSA put in place to ensure that truckers are not being charged more than the fair market rate for loading and offloading services; (h) prior to this arrangement with EPC, who provided these services and at what rate; (i) was there a conflict of interest analysis completed given EPC’s involvement with other businesses within the supply chain space, and, if so, what were the results of that analysis; (j) do EPC’s employees have the proper security clearance to provide these services, and who at CBSA is responsible for regularly ensuring those clearances are valid; and (k) was this a sole source contract?

Madam Speaker, I would ask that all remaining questions be allowed to stand.

Is that agreed? Some hon. members: Agreed.

Madam Speaker, I ask that all notices of motions for the production of papers be allowed to stand.

moved that Bill C-70, An Act respecting countering foreign interference, be read the third time and passed.

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to speak in support of Bill C-70, which proposes, among other things, to amend the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act. I hope that the report stage amendment offered today has the support of all parties. The amendment would permit CSIS to disclose, as part of a disclosure for the purpose of building resiliency against threat to the security of Canada, information specifically about a company with that company. The amendment would allow CSIS to be more candid and transparent with Canadian corporations and entities by disclosing information around specific threats and vulnerabilities affecting them. An example of this would be information about a foreign state's interest in acquiring the company's unique and proprietary information or technology. The reason the amendment is important is that this precision would ensure that companies, community organizations and universities have parity with individuals. The amendment is needed to ensure that the information sharing provisions found in the bill are the same for individuals and entities. As members know, on May 30, we passed a motion that sped up the committee's study and clause-by-clause consideration of Bill C-70 at the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security. Events moved quickly, and when one part of the bill was amended to provide enhanced information sharing authority for individuals, the same was not done for companies or community organizations and universities, as there was not enough time to properly craft the appropriate amendment. As such, there now exists an imbalance in the legislation, and this important amendment addresses it. It is essential that we pass this report stage amendment to ensure that CSIS can make authorized disclosures to both individuals and entities to better equip Canadians and Canadian society with the information and tools they need to build resiliency against foreign threats. We know that state actors exploit Canada's vulnerabilities by targeting federal, provincial, territorial, municipal and indigenous governments; our open academic systems; private enterprises; and even communities and individuals. The government has no obligation more important than the protection of its citizens. Unfortunately, we have seen a rise in the number of Canadians being threatened and harassed by foreign state actors, as well as a rise in foreign interference in our democratic institutions and our economy. The government's priority remains to protect Canada and Canadians against activities that undermine democratic values, economic interests, sovereignty and national security. In order to combat foreign interference, a whole of government and society response is required. The first step to combatting foreign interference is detecting it, which is why the bill introduces amendments to the CSIS Act. CSIS is mandated to protect Canada's national security. The CSIS Act came into force in 1984, well before the prolific use of digital technology that we see today. Technological innovations make it more difficult to detect and identify threat actors, including those engaged in foreign interference activities. These innovations have created new avenues for threat to interfere in Canadian society and institutions, especially in the online space. The bill introduces several new powers to assist CSIS in its investigation of foreign interference. These will close gaps in CSIS's authorities, which have become more acute with the global shift towards digital communication and technology. Throughout the consultation process, the government heard that we need to do more to protect vulnerable communities that are the targets of harassment and intimidation of foreign state actors. At the same time, we heard that any changes to the law need to be based on a real need and to continue to respect Canadian values. These changes do just that. In addition to the safeguards built into the bill itself, there are still robust review and oversight measures to which CSIS is subject. These were brought in by the government in 2019. Both the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians provide a robust review function of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service's activities to ensure they are effective and compliant with the law. The two objectives of effectiveness and compliance with the law are guiding the government's response. While technology has brought enormous benefits to society, it has also changed the way threat activity is conducted and how information flows. That is why, in addition to these new powers, the government is making other changes to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act to ensure we have the intelligence we need. This means updating the foreign intelligence provisions of the CSIS Act to account for changing technology. It also means we are making sure that CSIS can effectively use data to identify patterns of hostile activity, which may not be immediately obvious. Finally, this means introducing a requirement that Parliament review the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act every five years. This would ensure that we are continually evaluating the tools we have and the ones we may need, as well as that we have a robust and open public debate about them. Such a debate would allow Canadians to weigh in regularly to ensure that we are meeting our two objectives of effectiveness and compliance with the law. The threat of foreign interference is complex, but in order to counter it, we must detect it first. That is why these changes to the CSIS Act, when considered as part of a whole-of-government response to foreign interference, are so important.

Madam Speaker, the member talked about priorities. She said that it was very important for the government to take action on this issue. Let us go back in time a bit. A year ago, the Prime Minister did everything he could to slow things down. Instead of calling for a public inquiry, which all parties in the House were asking questions about, he launched an investigation into the CSIS leaks, calling them racist. The bill we are studying, Bill C-70, is interesting. The Bloc Québécois brought forward some amendments that were adopted. We will be supporting the bill. I have one question, though. Why was the security of Canada's democratic system not a priority for the government for six, seven, eight months?

Madam Speaker, I acknowledge the hard work that Bloc members did on the committee to bring forward the study and produce amendments. They worked diligently on the bill. When it comes to the member's question regarding the work our government is doing, I take exception to that. It was in 2015, when we were first elected, that we began implementing measures dealing with foreign interference and strengthening our democratic institutions. That included creating the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, as well as creating the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force to monitor elections and introducing additional measures through the Canada Elections Act legislation. This is not a stand-alone piece of legislation to deal with foreign interference. It is part of a building block, a foundation, to strengthen our democratic institutions.

Madam Speaker, quite simply, why did it take the government this long to bring forward a piece of legislation to protect Canada's democracy? Why did it take so long to acknowledge that this was a problem and bring forward this legislation in the last days of our parliamentary sitting? Why did it delay? Why was this not a priority for the government?

Madam Speaker, unfortunately, I cannot accept the hypocrisy in the question from the Conservative member. The fact is that it was in 2010, under Stephen Harper's government, that the alarm bells went off to alert the government to the issue of foreign interference. Mr. Harper did nothing to address it. In fact, he refused to create a committee of parliamentarians to review and provide oversight. When the current opposition leader was democratic institutions minister, we asked him why he did nothing to strengthen and protect our democratic institutions. He essentially said that it was not politically advantageous to him at the time to do so. Since we formed government in 2015, we have taken action while Conservatives have sat complicit. They have not provided a real approach to working with us and putting country over party on the issue of foreign interference.

Madam Speaker, it was a long slog through committee last week with Bill C-70, and ultimately this legislation is needed. We need to bring up to speed our analog laws so that they can thrive in a digital era. My question to my hon. colleague is this: The National Council of Canadian Muslims is publicly releasing a concerning statement about the definition of “intimidation” in the Security of Information Act amendments in the bill. I am just wondering if the parliamentary secretary could reply here on the floor of the House to those concerns from NCCM.

Madam Speaker, as I said in my speech, and I thank my hon. colleague for raising this, the balance that this legislation needs, not only in updating the tools for CSIS but also in creating those safeguards, is absolutely crucial. That is something we heard in testimony on this legislation at committee. I want to assure Canadians that these amendments are to apply to national security threats and risks, but in addition to that, we have ensured that the CSIS Act would, for the first time ever, have a five-year review so that parliamentarians and all Canadians can be part of this debate to ensure that the balance between national security and the protection of Canadians' rights and freedoms here in this country are paramount.

Madam Speaker, now that Bill C-70 is back in the House for third reading, I would like to take this opportunity to outline the long journey it took to get to this point. In 2018, the director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, David Vigneault, advised the government about threats presented by the People's Republic of China. That year, he warned the Prime Minister that PRC activities related to the threat of foreign interference were an existential threat for Parliament and the elections. Also in 2018, the government was advised that the measures then in place were not sufficient to counter these threats to Parliament and to our elections. We know that because it was the second finding of fact on page 73 of the NSICOP report. Also back in 2018, national security agencies advised the government to introduce a range of measures to counter these threats, including new legislation. It is also notable that in 2018, the CSIS director also advised the government of another threat from the PRC, which was the threat of espionage. We know that because, for the first time ever, the director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service gave a public speech in December of that year. In that speech, he warned of serious threats from the PRC closely related to foreign interference, which were those of espionage. These threats came in the form of espionage targeting Canadian companies and Canadian universities in the five sensitive areas he outlined at that time: artificial intelligence, quantum computing, 5G telecommunications technology, biopharma and clean tech. Subsequently, in 2019, the Clerk of the Privy Council sought the Prime Minister's approval for an action plan to protect Parliament and our elections. The Prime Minister did not approve that plan. Again, a year later, in December 2020, the national security and intelligence adviser to the Prime Minister sought the Prime Minister's approval again for that action plan to protect Parliament and our elections. Again, the Prime Minister did not approve the plan. For the third time, in February 2022, the national security and intelligence adviser resurrected this initiative, and again, the Prime Minister did not approve an action plan. In all three occasions over several years, the Prime Minister did not approve actions that would have protected Parliament and our elections. On November 18, 2020, the House adopted a motion calling on the government to produce a robust plan to counter foreign interference threat activities here on Canadian soil. Despite all of this advice, despite the call of the House of Commons to the government to enact a robust plan to counter foreign interference and to take additional measures to protect Canadian democracy, little was done. Then, because the Prime Minister did not approve actions to protect Parliament and our elections, and because the government failed to heed the call of the House in the motion adopted on November 18, 2020, foreign interference threats increased from 2018 to present. As Justice Hogue said in her initial report of May 3, the risk from the impacts of foreign interference will only increase as long as “sufficient protective measures to guard against it” are not taken. Then, subsequent to all of this, in the fall of 2022, explosive media reports about foreign interference threats broke. These reports raised questions about what the Prime Minister knew, when he knew it and why he did not act on the intelligence and the advice he was given by the senior civil service. Further explosive revelations in the subsequent months followed in the media. Finally, on March 6, 2023, the government promised to look at introducing measures in law to counter these threats. It took years for the government to take the advice of CSIS, the senior civil service and countless reports. It took years for the government to introduce legislation. Finally, after much urging, many controversies and a lot of work done by a great many people, the government reluctantly introduced Bill C‑70. That brings us to the debate today on Bill C-70 at third reading. Bill C-70 is a much-needed response to the existential threat to our democracy from foreign interference. It would modernize the CSIS Act, allowing CSIS to better obtain preservation and production orders, and national security warrants for obtaining information, records or documents, through a single attempt. It would better allow CSIS to collect, retain and analyze data for intelligence purposes. It would allow CSIS to collect foreign intelligence and to disclose classified information outside of the Government of Canada to provinces, municipalities, universities, companies and individuals being targeted. It would create new criminal offences for those who would engage in foreign interference here in Canada on behalf of a foreign state, ensuring that we could better protect Canadians against these corrosive, clandestine, corrupting and coercive activities, especially Canadians in diaspora communities who have suffered for so long in silence and isolation. It would also make it easier to prosecute these offences by removing the requirement to prove harm to the interests of Canada when a Canadian is targeted by foreign interference. It would create a new criminal offence that would better protect essential infrastructure in Canada, including stiff penalties for those who would sabotage essential infrastructure on behalf of a foreign state or a foreign government. It would amend the Canada Evidence Act and would make consequential to other acts so that it would allow information relating to foreign affairs, national defence or national security in Federal Court proceedings to be better handled. Finally, the bill would establish a foreign influence, transparency and accountability act, which would create a foreign influence registry and a new foreign influence transparency commissioner. The new foreign influence transparency commissioner would oversee a public registry containing information on individuals in Canada engaged in legitimate influence activities on behalf of a foreign principal. The bill was strengthened in committee, particularly with respect to the appointment of a commissioner. The commissioner would be appointed by the Governor in Council after consultation with leaders in the House of Commons and in the Senate, and after resolutions in the House of Commons and in the Senate are adopted. This would ensure that while the commissioner is situated within the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, within the machinery of government, the commissioner would have a degree of independence to manage and to interpret the act, to issue notices of compliance, to issue administrative monetary penalties and to refer matters to law enforcement for criminal prosecution. Time is of the essence. We must ensure that our democratic institutions and elections are protected from the threats of foreign interference. Inaction and delay cannot continue. As Justice Hogue noted in her initial report, the risk of the impacts from foreign interference will only increase as long as “sufficient protective measures to guard against it” are not taken. She also concluded that “foreign interference in the 2019 and 2021 [general] elections” undermined “public confidence in Canada's democracy”. As the general election draws closer, time is running out to strengthen the confidence Canadians have in our elections. Time is running out to combat the rising threat of foreign interference. Canadians need to be able to go to the polls in the next election and to be confident not only in the integrity of the overall election but also in the integrity of each of the elections that take place in each of the 338 electoral districts in Canada. This bill must pass, and I encourage all of my parliamentary colleagues, in this place and in the other place, to support this bill and to see its adoption into law before we adjourn for the summer.

Madam Speaker, I would like to acknowledge and thank my hon. colleague for his work on this legislation. I know he worked with the minister as well. In his speech, the member mentioned some of the amendments at committee, in particular, changes to the appointment of the commissioner, something Liberals supported as well. Could he speak about why this is so crucial to this process and why the committee moved forward with that amendment?

Madam Speaker, the hon. member points out amendments that were made to the bill that would see the commissioner not only appointed after consultations with the leaders in the House of Commons and Senate, but also after resolutions are adopted by the House and the Senate. I think that would strengthen the independence of the commissioner while also ensuring that the commissioner is situated within the machinery of government, within the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. This is an incredibly important balance to strike, which I think the committee did strike during its study of the bill, because we have heard for so many years from so many experts that there are too many silos within the national security apparatus of the Government of Canada. This would ensure sufficient independence to issue notices of compliance, to levy administrative monetary penalties, to refer a matter to criminal prosecution to police of jurisdiction, while at the same time ensuring that the commissioner is in the bureaucracy communicating with all parts of the national security system so that she could enforce this foreign influence transparency registry.

Madam Speaker, I have two simple questions for my colleague. First, why did the Conservative Party refuse to support the Bloc Québécois amendments, including a three-year ban on working for a foreign state for former public office holders? Here is the second question, the most important one: How can we trust the Conservative Party? This is the same party that allowed someone to enter the leadership race even though that person had collaborated with a company that collects data and collaborates with the Chinese regime. I am talking about Huawei. Jean Charest was a member of the Conservative Party during the leadership race, but he also worked and collaborated with the Chinese regime. How can we trust the Conservative Party when it has welcomed people into its ranks who collaborate with the Chinese regime?