SoVote

May/2/24 3:32:23 p.m.
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I am now prepared to rule on the question of privilege raised on April 10, 2024, by the member for St. Albert—Edmonton concerning allegedly misleading statements made by the Minister of National Defence. The question of privilege is based on his reading of the 63rd report of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, presented on April 10, 2024. According to the member, the testimony provided by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service director, David Vigneault, and by former deputy minister Rob Stewart in regard to an issues management note on foreign interference efforts and the content of the briefing note itself contradict the minister’s persistent denial of receiving the said note. As such, the member argued that the minister deliberately misled the House and the committee. For his part, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Government House Leader countered that the minister had not misled the House, and that his statements in committee and in the House had remained consistent. The parliamentary secretary also noted that the 63rd report made no reference to contradictory statements provided to the committee concerning this matter. I have mentioned, in my ruling of February 15, 2024, at page 21158 of the Debates, that three elements have to be established when it is alleged that a member is in contempt for deliberately misleading the House, namely: It must be proven that the statement was misleading; it must be established that, when making a statement, the member knew it to be incorrect; and finally, it must be demonstrated that the member intended to mislead the House. Like my predecessors, I have also remarked in a ruling on a similar matter, on December 13, 2023, that these three conditions are a very high threshold, and rightfully so. The charge of deliberately misleading the House or one of its committees is a serious one as it touches on the integrity of the member. With these observations and established conventions in mind, I have carefully examined the statements that were made concerning this matter, as well as the entire content of the 63rd report. The Chair must acknowledge the fact that the minister has been consistent in his statements that he did not receive the note in question. This is an assertion that the CSIS director seems to accept, based on the committee’s report. According to the report, at page 85, “Mr. Vigneault’s understanding...that it was clear that [the minister] never saw the IMU and that he had no reason to doubt [the minister] on that point.” Faced with a similar situation, on April 29, 2015, at page 13198 of the Debates, one of my predecessors said: With no evidence presented to the contrary, the conventions of this House dictate that, as your Speaker, I must take all Members at their word. To do otherwise, to take it upon myself to assess the truthfulness or accuracy of Members' statements is not a role which has been conferred on me, nor that the House has indicated that it would somehow wish the Chair to assume, with all of its implications. The ruling continues by quoting Speaker Milliken's words from page 10462 of the April 16, 2002, Debates. They are worth repeating: If we do not preserve the tradition of accepting the word of a fellow member, which is a fundamental principle of our parliamentary system, then freedom of speech, both inside and outside the House, is imperilled. It appears to the Chair that the current matter is a dispute as to the facts and that it constitutes a matter for debate, not a question of privilege. The Chair wishes to make one final observation in relation to a comment made by the member for St. Albert—Edmonton in his April 10 intervention. He suggested that by including a document in his party’s supplementary opinion, the House would now be seized with it. To this, I would refer members to House of Commons Procedure and Practice, third edition, at page 995: Committees are not responsible for the content of these opinions. They are not, strictly speaking, part of the report. The authors of these opinions alone are responsible for their content. I appreciate the efforts invested by the member for St. Albert—Edmonton and his colleagues from the procedure and house affairs committee in considering the question of privilege related to the member for Wellington—Halton Hills and to other members. They obviously did not take their responsibility lightly. I thank members for their attention.

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Context: House Hansard - 307 - May/2/24

Mr. Michael Cooper (St. Albert—Edmonton, CPC)

May/2/24 8:31:41 p.m.
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Mr. Speaker, I rise to follow up on a straightforward question that I posed to the Liberals recently during question period and did not get an answer to. That question is this: Which top Liberal broke the law by leaking classified CSIS information? In an explosive story, The Globe and Mail reported, based upon a top national security source, that during the 2019 election, the member for Don Valley North was tipped off that he was being monitored by CSIS. Recently, at the public inquiry into foreign interference, it was confirmed that three top Liberals, all connected closely to the Prime Minister, received a classified CSIS briefing during the 2019 election that Beijing interfered on behalf of the member for Don Valley North to secure the Liberal nomination. One of the top Liberals briefed, then briefed the Prime Minister's top adviser and the then national Liberal campaign director Jeremy Broadhurst about the contents of that classified briefing. It is important to note that Mr. Broadhurst had the appropriate security clearance to receive that information. Broadhurst then briefed the Prime Minister. We know that five top Liberals, including the Prime Minister himself, either received a classified CSIS briefing or were informed about the contents of that classified briefing. It follows, therefore, that it is almost certain that one of those five Liberals, perhaps the Prime Minister himself, leaked the classified information that led to the member for Don Valley North being tipped off that he was being monitored by CSIS. The leaker within the Prime Minister's inner circle committed something that is very serious in terms of what they did. They compromised CSIS's sources and methods, undermined an intelligence operation into Beijing's interference in our democracy, violated their oath of secrecy and committed a serious offence for which they could be punished and sent to jail for up to 14 years under the Security of Information Act. Someone in the Prime Minister's inner circle broke the law by putting the partisan interests of the Liberal Party ahead of Canada's national security. Which top Liberal broke the law? Who is the criminal leaker? I would like a name, please.

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Context: House Hansard - 307 - May/2/24

Mr. Mike Kelloway (Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Fisheries, Oceans and the Canadian Coast Guard, Lib.)

May/2/24 8:35:03 p.m.
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Mr. Speaker, we have all been closely following the proceedings of the public inquiry into foreign interference in Canada's democratic institutions. As members of the House will recall, in fact, our government convened the inquiry with the support of every party leader in this very House, and we all recognize how important it is to maintain the integrity of our democratic institutions. This week we heard from the Prime Minister and his staff, as well as senior public servants and intelligence officials, as they outlined the various ways intelligence is shared and used within the government to keep Canadians safe. The story here is quite simple. As the director of CSIS outlined on Friday, CSIS has been talking about foreign interference and foreign threats for many years, both inside and outside government, to officials, to ministers and to Canadians. It has always been clear that foreign interference is a serious threat to Canadian democracy. In response to those warnings, the government has taken several decisive actions, beginning with a plan to protect democracy before the 2019 election. Over the course of the 2019 and 2021 federal elections, the security and intelligence threats to elections task force coordinated efforts against foreign interference by assessing threats, sharing intelligence and briefing the panel, the ministers and political parties. Most recently, our government has been consulting Canadians on possible legislative amendments to ensure that we have the right tools and authorities to keep Canadians safe. To ensure that the measures we have taken are the right ones, we convened the public inquiry and asked Canada's national security review bodies, NSIRA and NSICOP, to look into the matter. Our government has supported an unprecedented level of transparency about sensitive national security issues. As members know, however, the protection of classified information is of the utmost importance. On Friday, the director of CSIS noted that an intelligence service must be able to protect the information it collects in order to succeed in protecting Canadians. Therefore, any leak of classified information is dangerous and something the government will never tolerate. Members also know that it would be inappropriate to discuss national security investigations in the House. That is not how we will ensure the protection of sensitive information. The government has confidence in security services, and we must let them perform their work. Foreign interference in Canada has not been a secret. The government and our intelligence officials have been telling Canadians about this for years, and we have taken decisive action to counter it and to continue to bolster our response. We are being as transparent as possible with Canadians about this challenge. The public inquiry and national security review bodies are ensuring our responses are appropriate. All Canadians have to play a role in countering national security threats, such as foreign interference. That includes members of the House, and I look forward to continuing to work together accordingly.

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