Hon. Tony Dean moved second reading of Bill C-70, An Act respecting countering foreign interference.

He said: Honourable senators, today, I am pleased to speak as the sponsor of Bill C-70, An Act respecting countering foreign interference, which has received rare unanimous support of the House of Commons.

We have learned over the past months, and at our National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs Committee last week, that foreign interference poses one of the greatest threats to Canadian society, our economic prosperity and our sovereignty.

Colleagues, this proposed legislation begins the process of providing our law enforcement and intelligence agencies with the enhanced tools and authorities that they need in order to strengthen our ability to detect and disrupt foreign interference threats to our national security while ensuring oversight and transparency.

Colleagues, Canada is not immune to this. Indeed, we are a prime target. We know that a growing number of foreign state actors have built and deployed programs dedicated to deceptive online and offline influence as part of their strategies to harm Canada.

In 2019, before a general election, the government announced the plan to protect Canada’s democracy. Measures introduced as part of the plan included the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol, the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force, the Digital Citizen Initiative, the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, and the Canada Declaration on Electoral Integrity Online. These measures were in place for the 2019 election with the intention of countering any foreign interference attempts.

Fast-forward to 2022 when the media reported on the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS, leaks that alleged that China had engaged in foreign interference in the 2019 and 2021 elections. At this point, it became clear that the measures put in place were not enough to protect us from foreign powers interfering in our elections. This prompted committee studies on foreign interference in the House of Commons.

In March 2023, the Prime Minister announced a number of independent reviews. The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, or NSIRA, was asked to conduct a review of the flow of information from national security agencies to decision makers during the forty-third and forty-fourth general elections. Their review focused on the production and dissemination of intelligence on foreign interference, including how it was communicated across the government.

Key recommendations in this report include the following: to make explicit CSIS’s thresholds and practices for the communication and dissemination of intelligence regarding political interference — this would include the relevant levels of confidence, corroboration, contextualization and characterization necessary for intelligence to be reported; to clearly articulate CSIS’s risk tolerance for taking action against threats of political interference; to make clear any special requirements or procedures that would apply during election and writ periods as necessary, including particular procedures for the timely dissemination of intelligence about political foreign interference; and also to look at best practices from international partners, including the Five Eyes, regarding investigating and reporting on political foreign interference.

The Prime Minister also requested that the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, or NSICOP, “complete a review to assess the state of foreign interference in federal election processes” with respect to:

. . . foreign interference attempts that occurred in the 43rd and 44th federal general elections, including potential effects on Canada’s democracy and institutions . . . .

NSICOP published its report on foreign interference at the beginning of June. Three of our colleagues in this chamber are members of the committee.

Building on its highly informative 2019 report, NSICOP concluded:

Foreign states conduct sophisticated and pervasive foreign interference specifically targeting Canada’s democratic processes and institutions, occurring before, during and after elections and in all orders of government. These activities continue to pose a significant threat to national security, and to the overall integrity of Canada’s democracy. . . .

NSICOP reported that key tactics in foreign interference include the following: covertly influencing the opinions and positions of voters, ethnocultural communities and parliamentarians; leveraging relationships with influential Canadians; exploiting vulnerabilities in political party governance and administration; deploying a variety of cyber tools to attain specific objectives; and using mainstream media, social media and other digital means to conduct interference activities.

These interference activities were conducted by foreign diplomats, intelligence officers, state proxies and co-optees, and directed at all levels of government, civil society groups, ethnocultural communities, business persons and journalists.

In the fall of 2023, the government launched the Foreign Interference Commission to respond to concerns about foreign interference in the last two elections. The commission heard directly from witnesses that foreign state actors are monitoring, intimidating and harassing those in many communities across Canada, particularly in diaspora communities. Members of these communities testified about their experience of that foreign interference, or the experience of others. This includes threats to them or their families back home.

Finally, the government held public consultations to guide the creation of a foreign influence transparency registry in Canada, and separate consultations that focused on potential legislative amendments to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, the Criminal Code, the Security of Information Act, and the Canada Evidence Act.

Colleagues, we have very clear and pressing legal, policy, operational and national security challenges at our doorstep, and this demands action.

This is represented in Bill C-70, which would enhance Canada’s ability to detect and disrupt foreign interference and better protect citizens against threats posed by malign foreign influence.

A centrepiece of this bill is the foreign influence transparency and accountability act, or FITAA, which would mandate the establishment of a new registry. The registry, as outlined in clause 9 of Part 4 of the bill, would be administered and enforced by an independent foreign influence transparency commissioner, who would be appointed by the Governor-in-Council, which, by the way, distinguishes it from its Australian and U.K. counterparts.

Clause 9(2) would require that prior to making the appointment of the commissioner, the government must consult with Senate leaders and facilitators of recognized parties or parliamentary groups, the Leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons, and the leader in the House of Commons of each party having at least 12 members in that house.

These were strengthened during the House of Commons committee study when an NDP amendment was approved unanimously by the committee, which would require that the approval of a commissioner occur by resolution of the Senate and the House of Commons. This amendment strengthens the independence of the commissioner while also ensuring that the commissioner is situated within the machinery of government in the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness.

The bill defines foreign influence arrangements in clause 2 of Part 4 of the bill as an activity:

. . . a person undertakes to carry out, under the direction of or in association with a foreign principal, any of the following activities in relation to a political or governmental process in Canada . . . .

(a) communicating with a public office holder;

(b) communicating or disseminating or causing to be communicated or disseminated by any means, including social media, information that is related to the political or governmental process;

(c) distributing money or items of value or providing a service or the use of a facility.

This definition is critical, as certain information related to an “arrangement” would be disclosed on the registry. The classes of information to be disclosed would be set out by way of regulation.

An arrangement would require three elements: for a person to act under the direction of or in association with a foreign principal; the person would have to engage in at least one of the foreign influence activities listed in the definition; and the activity would need to be done in relation to a political or governmental process in Canada.

The bill also defines “foreign principal” as the following:

. . . a foreign economic entity, a foreign entity, a foreign power or a foreign state, as those expressions are defined in subsection 2(1) of the Security of Information Act.

This definition is broad and intended to incorporate the wide and diverse ways in which foreign governments hold power.

As laid out in clause 3 of Part 4, it is designed to bring transparency to efforts by foreign actors to interfere in our political or governmental processes while also increasing public awareness.

Under clause 5(1) of Part 4:

A person who enters into an arrangement with a foreign principal must, within 14 days after the day on which they enter into the arrangement, provide the Commissioner with the information specified in the regulations.

The window to provide information is set at 14 days to allow time for the individual to finalize their arrangement and then undertake to register it in a reasonable period of time.

The proposed act is not intended to prohibit arrangements with foreign principals in Canada; it is only that those activities and certain details surrounding those arrangements should be made transparent.

Amendments were advanced by the government during the House of Commons committee study to introduce additional transition provisions to ensure that pre-existing arrangements are captured by the act and apply between foreign principals and federal, provincial, territorial or Indigenous processes. The information on these arrangements would need to be provided to the commissioner within 60 days after the act comes into force.

The existence of AMPs, or administrative monetary penalties, in the proposed act bolsters the commissioner’s ability to bring individuals into compliance with the law and dissuades actors who may otherwise seek to actively avoid registration obligations.

Clause 23 of Part 4 is concerned with the same violations of clauses 5(1), 5(2) and 7; however, instead of administrative monetary penalties, it provides the commissioner with the ability to pursue these violations as criminal offences, which police of jurisdiction could investigate.

Importantly, Canadians would also be able to examine the registry online to see whether an individual or organization with whom they have come into contact is registered as acting at the direction of or in association with a foreign principal, or if the commissioner has imposed a penalty on any individual or organization for not upholding their registration obligations.

Finally, one further amendment introduced by the Bloc Québécois changed the five-year statutory parliamentary review provision and received unanimous support from the committee. With this new change, the foreign influence transparency and accountability act, or FITAA, will be reviewed during the first year after a federal general election moving forward. This will ensure that the provisions of FITAA stay up to date with emerging threats and the challenges they produce.

Colleagues, we know that there are established legal and legitimate forms of engagement with foreign actors, including lobbying, advocacy efforts and regular diplomatic activity. This bill is not intended to limit these activities. However, we also know that there are activities undertaken by foreign actors in non-transparent ways that seek to influence our political or governmental processes. This bill would bring us into alignment with international best practices and with our Five Eyes allies, most of whom have introduced registries of their own to counter malign foreign influence.

The registry, colleagues, would be an important first step in addressing the threat of foreign interference, but foreign interference is a complex national security threat that requires a multi-faceted approach. As I mentioned, Bill C-70 also contains amendments to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, or CSIS Act, the Criminal Code, the Security of Information Act, or SOIA, and the Canada Evidence Act, or CEA.

Let’s first turn to the Security of Information Act provisions in Part 2 of the act.

Changes to the SOIA would better address foreign interference risks to Canada and ensure that surreptitious or deceptive hostile activities — including those directed at our democratic processes, such as the nomination of political candidates — are addressed by criminal law. They would also better address transnational threats or violence by foreign states and those who work on their behalf to intimidate people living in Canada and their families, wherever those family members might be.

The bill would amend the SOIA by creating three new offences relating to foreign interference and by amending the existing offences for intimidation, threats and violence to make them more responsive to modern-day threats. The three new offences include a general foreign interference offence committed for a foreign entity, an indictable offence committed for a foreign entity and political interference for a foreign entity.

The first new offence is a general foreign interference offence where a person knowingly engages in surreptitious or deceptive conduct, or omits to do anything, at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity. An example of this offence could be knowingly facilitating the entry into Canada of agents of a foreign entity who are posing as tourists.

Second, the bill would make it a distinct offence to commit an indictable offence at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity. An example of this offence could be if an individual who commits bribery, which is an existing offence under the Criminal Code, bribes a Canadian official for the benefit of the foreign state that they support.

Third, the bill would make it an offence to engage in surreptitious or deceptive conduct at the direction of or in association with a foreign entity with the intent to influence a Canadian political or governmental process, or to influence the exercise of a democratic right in Canada. An example of this offence would be someone who, acting at the direction of a foreign entity, creates large numbers of counterfeit party memberships in order to influence the result of a party leadership vote.

Finally, as I mentioned, the bill would amend the existing section 20 offence in the SOIA to focus on the intimidation, threat of violence done on behalf of or in association with a foreign state. It removes the need to prove that the act was for the purpose of harming Canadian interests or increasing foreign capacity to do so. An example of a section 20 offence could be an individual in Canada who is working on behalf of a foreign state and threatening to harm relatives of a Canadian citizen who live in that foreign state if the citizen does not stop their criticism of the foreign state.

The bill also creates a new offence in the SOIA that captures threats or violence on behalf of a foreign entity that take place outside of Canada in limited circumstances.

All of these proposed offences would be punishable by a maximum penalty of imprisonment for life.

The bill would also increase the penalty for preparatory acts — actions taken to prepare to commit the most serious SOIA offences — from two years’ imprisonment to five years. Sentencing judges will still be bound by the principle of proportionality, but these changes are reflective of the serious nature of the criminality associated with foreign interference.

I now turn to the Criminal Code amendments. The bill would modernize the existing sabotage offence in the Criminal Code and add two new companion offences concerning essential infrastructure and the making, possession or distribution of devices that are designed to be used for sabotage, such as bots and malware. This modernization will ensure the offence is responsive to today’s threat environment and includes acts that are taken in preparation to commit economic espionage.

Colleagues, this provision was further amended during the House of Commons committee consideration to extend the scope of the provision to essential infrastructure that is in the construction phase and not yet operational.

This extension of the provisions found in clause 61 is important, as interference with the construction or installation of essential infrastructure could be done with the intent of causing harms to Canada. For example, impeding the installation of an emergency water supply might constitute such an act.

The bill would also clarify that activities undertaken in the context of advocacy, protest or dissent would not constitute sabotage where the person did not intend to commit sabotage. To quote from the Charter statement tabled by the government:

Because these proposed offences give rise to the possibility of imprisonment, they engage the section 7 right to liberty and so must respect the principles of fundamental justice. To the extent that these offences have the potential to impact individuals engaged in advocacy or protest, they may also engage the freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly under sections 2(b) and 2(c) of the Charter. The following considerations support the consistency of the proposed sabotage offences with the Charter.

The scope of the proposed sabotage offences is tailored to the legislative objective of protecting important Canadian interests and essential infrastructure against serious harms. The main sabotage offence and the essential infrastructure sabotage offence both incorporate a stringent guilty mind component, requiring an intent to cause specified and serious harms. Legitimate protest, advocacy and dissent, in circumstances where there is no intention to cause the specified harms, is not captured by the offences. The companion offence of making, possessing, selling or distributing a device for the commission of a sabotage offence is limited to devices that have been specifically designed for the harmful purpose of facilitating a sabotage offence. All three offences preserve the discretion of the trial judge to craft a fit and appropriate sentence.

Colleagues, on top of Charter protections that exist for protests and freedom of expression, there is a specific “For greater certainty” clause included in the bill, which states that the sabotage offence does not capture any person who is engaged in advocacy, protest or dissent and did not intend to cause harm to critical infrastructure. Additionally, for this offence to be charged, there must be an Attorney General’s consent provided, adding an additional layer of accountability.

Colleagues, I now move on to amendments to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, or CSIS Act.

Under this legislation, targeted amendments to the CSIS Act would better equip the government to build resilience and counter modern threats that Canada faces today.

While it has been amended before, the CSIS Act was first enacted in 1984, a time when the prolific use and expansion of digital technology was still nascent. Today, as you know, digital technologies are a part of every aspect of our lives.

Technological innovations make it more difficult to detect and identify threat actors, including those engaged in foreign interference activities. These innovations have created new avenues for threat actors to interfere in Canadian society and institutions, especially in the online space.

CSIS must therefore be able to operate in a digital world that is constantly and rapidly changing. To that end, there are a few key changes to the CSIS Act, including giving CSIS the power to collect, from within Canada, foreign intelligence that resides outside Canada. This is an important new addition to CSIS’s powers. Also, new warrant and order provisions will allow CSIS to better carry out investigations. Another change regards the use and sharing of datasets, which are certainly clarified in ways that are responsive to the March 27, 2024, report of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, or NSIRA. Importantly, new powers would also enable CSIS to share sensitive information with non-federal partners at all levels of government, in academia and in the private sector, something that for a long time people have been calling for.

First, court decisions have made it clear that CSIS can’t collect foreign intelligence from within Canada when the information is outside Canada. But this geographic limitation restricts foreign intelligence collection in ways that could not have been foreseen in 1984, given how information today is largely digital and borderless. Electronic information that was previously collected in support of Canada’s foreign affairs or national defence is now frequently located outside our borders. Amendments seek to clarify CSIS’s authority to collect from within Canada foreign intelligence that is located outside Canada while still maintaining other limitations originally intended by Parliament.

Second, the bill introduces several new powers to assist CSIS in its investigation of foreign interference. Clause 37 introduces preservation and production orders. While they would be new to the CSIS Act, preservation and production orders are not in themselves new tools. The proposed amendments are modelled on orders routinely relied upon by Canadian law enforcement and intelligence agencies and in other democracies.

For a preservation order, CSIS may seek a warrant to order a third party to preserve any information, record, document or thing. The proposed threshold for obtaining a preservation order is reasonable grounds to suspect. Making such an application does not require the prior approval of the minister because CSIS would not be able to collect any information, record, document or thing. However, the minister would have to be notified once a preservation order application has been filed.

In the event that the Federal Court grants the preservation order, CSIS would still be required under the new provisions to return to the court, having obtained the minister’s approval, and demonstrate reasonable grounds to believe that a production order or warrant is required to obtain the preserved information, record, document or thing.

As such, the threshold for CSIS to collect information would remain high, with additional safeguards and oversight from the minister, the court, NSIRA and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, or NSICOP.

For example, if CSIS were to receive information that a foreign interference threat is linked to an individual’s phone number, it could quickly obtain a preservation order from the Federal Court to ensure that call logs and text messages implicated in the foreign interference activities are not destroyed. They could then seek a production order from the court to obtain the messages along with the identity of the subscriber.

This, colleagues, would help CSIS to more effectively identify and investigate foreign interference threat actors and activities and, if necessary, take action to disrupt those threats.

Second, in clause 39, the bill introduces a new single-use warrant which is much like a search warrant for law enforcement. Unlike a normal warrant, this would be a tool available to CSIS without exhausting other investigative methods, such as recruiting sources or conducting interviews. This would enable the service to obtain important information earlier in an investigation. These amendments would continue to respect Canadian fundamental rights and freedoms, with strong review, oversight and transparency measures still in place and unchanged.

To obtain a single collection activity warrant, CSIS would still be required to satisfy all other core requirements of normal warrant applications, including obtaining ministerial approval, as well as demonstrating to the Federal Court that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the warrant is required and will assist in the investigation. The court must also be informed of all previous warrant applications against the same subject of investigation.

This requirement would ensure that the court would be aware of how many times this new warrant authority had been previously granted against the same subject of investigation.

These proposals reflect the high expectation of privacy that people in Canada have, including the protections provided by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Third is the ability to use and share datasets. A dataset is defined in the act as a collection of information stored as an electronic record and characterized by a common subject matter and that does not directly and immediately relate to a threat to the security of Canada. CSIS may collect the dataset if it can demonstrate that the dataset is, however, relevant to the performance of its functions.

There is a higher threshold for the retention of foreign Canadian datasets, where CSIS must establish a “likely to assist” threshold. Proposed changes to the dataset regime are designed to clarify the application of the dataset and to allow more flexibility in the evaluation and retention of datasets, extending the initial evaluation period from 90 to 100 days, which recognizes, for example, requirements for decryption, translation and evaluation.

Fourth, the new authorized disclosure provisions found in clause 34 of the bill will help build resiliency against threats.

At the time of enacting the CSIS Act, national security was primarily the purview of the federal government, where espionage and foreign interference targeted military technology and federal government institutions. For that reason, CSIS is authorized to collect, retain and provide necessary intelligence to the federal government to make decisions to protect Canada’s national security.

Today, threats to the security of Canada, including foreign interference, impact every order of government and all sectors of society, including Canadian communities, provincial and municipal governments, academia, the media and private enterprises.

CSIS’s expertise and information are increasingly relevant to those outside of the federal government, and these partners are increasingly turning to CSIS for more information that can help them better understand, recognize and build resilience against threats. This is a very important change to the CSIS regime.

This provision was amended during the House of Commons study to add an exception to ensure CSIS could disclose an individual’s personal information to that individual. This amendment, which received all-party support, would allow CSIS to be more candid and transparent with Canadians by disclosing information around specific threats and vulnerabilities affecting them.

For example, colleagues, without this amendment, CSIS would not be able to tell a senator that their personal email address was found in a forum on the dark web known to be used by hostile state actors. That has now been rectified.

A report-stage amendment in the other place has ensured that these new exceptions are also mirrored for corporations and entities.

This new disclosure authority would require that the information CSIS seeks to disclose also be provided to the federal department or agency that performs duties and functions to which the information is relevant where one exists. The information disclosed under this provision cannot include any personal information pertaining to a Canadian citizen, permanent resident or any individual in Canada, or contain the name of a Canadian entity or a corporation incorporated under federal or provincial law.

CSIS can, however, disclose information it holds about foreign states or non-Canadian entities who pose threats to Canada’s national security.

In cases where disclosing personal information or naming the name of a Canadian entity would be essential to the public interest, the minister would decide whether disclosure outweighs the potential privacy intrusion.

Finally, the government has included an ongoing five-year parliamentary review of the CSIS Act. Currently, there is no statutory requirement for Parliament to review the CSIS Act on a regular basis. Clause 44 would set out a mechanism for parliamentary review of the act every five years to ensure that it keeps pace with new technologies and evolving national security threats and to provide additional oversight of the service’s powers.

In conclusion, colleagues, Canadians have been very clear about what they need to feel safe and better protected from foreign interference threats. They have said that our country needs a foreign interference registry. They’ve said that they need information that will help them understand and address this threat. In particular, scientists, universities, enterprises, municipalities and other entities that frequently deal with foreign principals need guidance on how to do this transparently. Importantly, Canadians have said that we need to move quickly on this to have it in place by the next election.

During our Senate pre-study, former director of CSIS Richard Fadden stated:

To delay Bill C-70 to the point that it will not be in place before the next election would be a gift to our adversaries.

Katherine Leung, Policy Advisor at Hong Kong Watch, said:

This bill would give Canada a much stronger framework to combat foreign interference than we currently have in place and should be in place before the next election.

Honourable senators, foreign interference undermines public confidence in governments, public servants and democratic institutions and processes. Canadians need and must be equipped with tools to be able to recognize when foreign powers are attempting to influence them or to intimidate them or their families in their homes.

Colleagues, it’s my recommendation that this chamber deal with this proposed legislation expeditiously, but that, as always, lies in your experienced hands. Thank you.