Hon. Tony Dean moved third reading of Bill C-70, An Act respecting countering foreign interference.

He said: Honourable senators, I rise to speak at third reading of Bill C-70, the countering foreign interference act. This will be a shorter speech today, and I share your relief collectively and individually in that experience.

Bill C-70 is a significant legislative initiative touching on three existing acts and creating an important new one — all in the realm of national security and defence in Canada.

When we think about public policy initiatives, we are generally engaged in trying to seize opportunities — business opportunities, export opportunities — or addressing harms. Some of them are complex and need multi-faceted responses. In this case, the government tries to develop a range of approaches in an effort to wrap its arms around the nature and character of the problem that we’re facing. We have seen here public servants in the room — senators Harder, Cotter, McNair, Oudar and Saint-Germain — who will attest to that.

In this case, Bill C-70 is designed to address the complex challenge of protecting Canadians and others living in Canada from foreign states seeking to interfere in Canadian democracy, major institutions and communities, including parliamentarians, diaspora communities and universities. These activities are deceptive, threatening and, in many cases, illegal.

Foreign interference — and malign foreign interference, more specifically — is distinct from legal and legitimate channels of engagement such as lobbying, advocacy efforts and regular diplomatic activity. Foreign interference takes complex forms, and it’s evasive by nature.

We have learned about foreign interference through a number of reports and studies, and it’s therefore necessary to develop multi-faceted approaches in order to disrupt these efforts. This is a feature of the countering foreign interference act.

I spoke at second reading about past initiatives to reform Canada’s responses, and I want to do that in much briefer form today.

In 2019, before a Canadian general election, the government announced the Plan to Protect Canada’s Democracy, which included, among other measures, the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol and the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force.

In 2022, leaks emerged from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS, alleging that China had engaged in foreign interference in the 2019 and 2021 federal elections. This, in turn, prompted committee studies on foreign interference in the House of Commons.

In March 2023, the Prime Minister requested two independent reviews on the issue. The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, or NSIRA, was asked to conduct a review focused on the production and dissemination of intelligence on foreign interference, including how it was communicated across the government.

In a parallel report released just weeks ago, the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, or NSICOP, concluded that:

Foreign states conduct sophisticated . . . foreign interference specifically targeting Canada’s democratic processes and institutions, occurring before, during and after elections and in all orders of government. These activities continue to pose a significant threat to national security, and to the overall integrity of Canada’s democracy. . . .

China, India and Iran were named as the most active perpetrators.

In fall 2024, the government launched the Foreign Interference Commission to respond to increasing concerns about the issue. Witnesses reinforced the need to address this critical threat, reporting instances of foreign state actors monitoring, intimidating and harassing them and their families. And, of course, we know this is a much more pressing issue in diaspora communities.

One year ago, the government also held public consultations to guide the creation of the foreign registry as well as separate consultations that focused on potential legislative amendments to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, the Criminal Code, the Security of Information Act and the Canada Evidence Act.

I go through all of that again just to remind you, colleagues, that this bill did not come out of nowhere. It was not created in a vacuum. Indeed, it was the result of over a year of consultation and expert advice.

I will summarize again but briefly the key changes in this act without recounting the extensive detail covered at second reading.

First, changes to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, the CSIS Act, would give CSIS new authorities to provide advice to non-federal partners, including other orders of government, enabling them to build resilience against threats; initiate a five-year parliamentary review of the CSIS Act; provide for a range of warrant powers tailored to the requirements of an investigation; and, importantly, allow CSIS to collect from within Canada foreign intelligence that resides outside of Canada.

The bill would also amend the Security of Information Act, or SOIA, to create new targeted foreign interference offences, including a general foreign interference offence committed for a foreign entity, an indictable offence committed for a foreign entity and political interference for a foreign entity. It would amend the existing offence of foreign-influenced threats or violence — section 20 — by removing the need to prove that the act actually helped foreign state actors or did harm to Canada. It would increase the penalty for preparatory offences from two years to five if done in connection with a SOIA offence, punishable by 10-plus years in prison. The bill would also amend the definition of “special operational information” to address the inappropriate sharing of military technology and knowledge.

Proposed changes to the Criminal Code would strengthen the legal response to sabotage by enacting a new sabotage offence focused on conduct directed at essential infrastructure and specify categories of protected essential infrastructure. The amendments would also expressly clarify that the sabotage offences do not apply to legitimate advocacy, protest or dissent in circumstances where there is no intention to cause the serious harms specified in the legislation. They would introduce a new offence of making, possessing, selling or distributing a device to commit a sabotage offence, such as malware or bots.

An amendment in the House of Commons also included a reference to essential infrastructure under construction.

Finally, colleagues, the foreign influence transparency and accountability act would enact the foreign registry, which would be administered and enforced by an independent foreign influence transparency commissioner. The commissioner would be appointed by the Governor-in-Council, which, by the way, distinguishes the bill from its Australian and UK counterparts, where the power rests with the minister responsible.

The appointment of the commissioner would require consultation with all the major groups and parties in the House of Commons and in the Senate, and final approval from both houses as well.

A foreign influence arrangement is defined as an arrangement under which a person undertakes to carry out, under the direction of or in association with a foreign principal, a number of activities in relation to a political or governmental process in Canada, including communicating with a public office holder, communicating or disseminating information that is related to the political or governmental process, and distributing money or items of value or providing a service or the use of a facility.

I would note that this is not an exhaustive list and that the term “political process” would capture not only elections and nomination contests but, crucially, also leadership contests.

An arrangement would require three elements, a three-part test: a person to act under the direction of or in association with a foreign principal, engagement in at least one of the foreign influence activities listed in the definition, and that the activity be performed in relation to a political or governmental process in Canada.

As a reminder, “foreign principal” is defined as:

. . . a foreign economic entity, a foreign entity, a foreign power or a foreign state, as those expressions are defined in . . . the Security of Information Act.

Colleagues, it warrants repetition: The bill is not intended to prohibit arrangements with foreign principals in Canada, but it does state that those arrangements should be transparent.

Failing to register an arrangement or activity within 14 days could result in penalties, such as a notice of violation or administrative monetary penalties to enforce or encourage compliance. In more serious cases, the commissioner would have the ability to pursue these violations as criminal offences, which police of jurisdiction could investigate.

Finally, as a result of an amendment in the other place, the statutory parliamentary review has been changed from five years to one year after a federal general election. This ensures there are additional checks and balances in the bill.

Colleagues, I also want to speak briefly about the pre-study at the Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs. These meetings were chaired by our colleague Senator Dagenais, the deputy chair, because, as sponsor, I stood down as chair. I want to thank and applaud Senator Dagenais for his diligent work and for managing a considerable number of intensive hearings with very tough issues under discussion.

At the same time, I commend my colleagues on the Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs, who are a brilliant group of parliamentarians and not only provide good advice but ask tough questions and exercise judgment with diligence and grace. It’s a committee I am proud to be part of and to chair.

Thank you, colleagues.

The committee met for a total of 10 hours over three days — June 10, 12 and 13 — and heard from 35 witnesses. Witnesses highlighted their support for the bill and their expectation of seeing it passed quickly.

Daniel Stanton, a former intelligence officer at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS, stated that Bill C-70:

. . . will not only strengthen Canada’s national security, but foster more trust among Canadians in the resiliency of our democratic institutions.

He continued, stating:

Without these significant changes to the Security of Information Act, there will not be any serious consequences to foreign interference and transnational repression. These amendments, as well as the foreign agent registry, will significantly mitigate the significant threat to our nation’s national security.

Balpreet Singh Boparai of the World Sikh Organization of Canada said:

. . . the legislation gives CSIS the power to disclose information to any person or entity, should CSIS deem it relevant. This would be a positive step as members of the Sikh community have received duties to warn, with no details on the sorts of threats they face or any resources to protect themselves. . . .

Mehmet Tohti, Executive Director of the Uyghur Rights Advocacy Project, said:

The expansion of information disclosure to anyone, not just a public official, if deemed essential in the public interest, will allow for enhanced bureaucratic transparency.

He continued, saying that it:

. . . serves to strengthen Canada’s trust in the agency and in its capacity to detect, prevent and respond to the threat of foreign agents . . . .

Trevor Neiman from the Business Council of Canada said that Canada’s “. . . business community is broadly supportive of Bill C-70 in its entirety.”

He continued, saying:

Despite CSIS having both the knowledge and expertise to help Canadian companies withstand growing threats, CSIS’s outdated legislation means businesses are left fending for themselves. . . .

He also said that:

With new threat intelligence sharing authorities, CSIS could communicate more specific and tangible information with Canadian companies. This would give business leaders a clear understanding of the growing threat, as well as the protective measures that could be taken to better safeguard their employees, customers as well as the communities in which they operate.

We also heard from many civil liberties groups, who are deeply concerned with the speed of this legislative process and some potential negative impacts of the bill on individual rights and liberties. We must listen closely to this community also.

Some observations appended to the report include the need for adequate resourcing for the RCMP to enforce the provisions of the bill; the uncertainty created for universities in their relationships and partnerships with foreign schools and the need for the foreign influence transparency registry commissioner to engage with these groups and provide guidance and clarity on their obligations under the act; the potential unintended impacts on diaspora communities and individual rights, including freedom of expression and freedom of association; and, lastly, the recognition that the committee would have benefitted from additional time to study this legislation.

Colleagues, we have heard from senators that we would all have appreciated more time to study such a complex bill and consider amendments.

I am going to share with you, and I hope my committee colleagues will understand and appreciate this, that toward the conclusion of our meeting and continuing on after the meeting ended, to a person — I believe this was a unanimous view — members of the committee were concerned enough that they were searching between themselves for appropriate approaches. One of those was that the committee not close down its study and end its terms of reference but, indeed, consider the possibility of seeking a new order of reference to continue observing the ongoing development and formation of the institution, the processes and the regulations that will be developed as a result of this registry’s creation.

Colleagues, I understand all of these concerns that were raised. I want to state very clearly that my belief is that this is an urgent issue we need to act on now.

Foreign interference is a major and growing threat to our national security. It has already affected us. In fact, yesterday, David Eby, the Premier of British Columbia, in a letter addressed to the Prime Minister, said, “Serious allegations of foreign interference at the federal level are making headlines in B.C.”

The letter continues, saying:

. . . our government does not have the information we need to intercept and address any alleged foreign interference at the provincial level.

Based on public media reports, we have credible reasons to suspect state-level interference with British Columbians with personal connections or relatives in China, Iran, Ukraine, India and Russia. We have grave concerns about the activities of transnational organized crime, based on our money laundering inquiry. Expert advice following a recent computer security incident involving provincial government e-mail has given us reason to suspect the involvement of a state-level actor.

Colleagues, we know this is not the only instance of state-level actors being involved with the electronic and digital infrastructure of private sector and government organizations, because we have seen reports on that too.

The premier’s letter continues:

Once passed, please bring this bill into force immediately so that we may . . . take any action required here in British Columbia.

Colleagues, this is not something to be taken lightly. Provinces, municipalities, diaspora communities, businesses, universities and other groups are counting on us to pass this bill quickly, and it is our job to protect them.

We must worry about diaspora communities. I’ve spoken to those in Toronto, as you have to those in your own communities, who have had their identities stolen online and replaced with vicious characterizations about their behaviour and businesses they might be involved in. This is vicious. All of these things are in the mix, and our diaspora communities are being affected by this daily.

Colleagues, before concluding, I want to again return to our discussions yesterday at the National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs Committee and the broad consensus that we should seek permission in the fall — or earlier — to continue an oversight role in examining the ongoing process of engagement, the regulation-making process and other key policy and design matters associated with Bill C-70.

Colleagues, thank you. It is a privilege, as always, to engage in this hugely important work with you, and I look forward to seeing this bill passed.

Thank you so much.

Hon. Tony Dean: Honourable senators, I’ll be brief. I’m going to add to comments already made about our colleague Senator Woo: No one can unravel complex and indecipherable statutes as well as our good friend there, and that’s a skill indeed. I’m grateful to Senator Woo for bringing these ideas and this proposal to our attention.

Senator Woo feels that the framing of the language, to put it simply, casts too wide a net. I think, from my reading and intention of this, that a registry is indeed intended to cast a wide net. That is its purpose. I think it has two purposes: to cast a wide net, to see what that net looks like and then to look at actors and individuals who may not have chosen to join the registry. It’s an interesting device and tool, and we see it used in other regulatory contexts.

The discussion about scope is critically important, and I’m glad that we’re having it. My own concern with this is that the solution to that as proposed by Senator Woo would narrow the scope of this and move too much in the other direction, if I can put it that way, and that we’d end up with a relatively small number of registrants, and one of the purposes of the registry would be defeated.

That’s a concern that I have, and for that reason I’m not inclined to support the amendment even though I find it painful to do that, I will admit.

As Senator Woo mentioned, there will be a commissioner. That commissioner, hopefully, will be appointed early, and we’ll have a role in that appointment. I suspect that commissioner will deal very quickly with issues like parliamentary travel and what I would call the extraneous group of concerns that have been raised about this, and they should be concerned, but I think they’re easily dealt with.

At the end of the day, my concern is what we would be left with if we were to adopt this and how that would operate within this scheme and its relationship with other elements of a complex of instruments that is being contemplated in terms of pushing foreign interference to the ground.

So there it is: it’s brief and straightforward, and I’ll leave it at that. Thank you, Senator Woo.