Hon. Peter M. Boehm: Honourable senators, I rise to speak to Bill C-70, the countering foreign interference act.

Much has been said already, but given the seriousness of the subject matter and its impact on a foundational element of Canadian society, namely our very democracy, I wish to add my voice to this important debate.

The revelations in the Special Report on Foreign Interference in Canada’s Democratic Processes and Institutions released recently by the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, also known as NSICOP, were unsettling. It demonstrates that Canadians, least of all the government and parliamentarians, can no longer sit back and turn a blind eye to interference by foreign states in our democratic processes.

As the report revealed, current and former elected officials have wittingly colluded with foreign governments against Canada’s national interests. Despite its domination of the news cycle lately, foreign interference against Canada and other countries has been a problem for decades.

There has been much debate and frustration over the timing of this bill because, after years of ignoring a clear and present danger, it is both only coming now and is being rushed through Parliament in only a few weeks.

One thing all parliamentarians and Canadians agree on is that Canada needs to finally start taking seriously the significant national security threat of foreign interference. That is what Bill C-70 aims to do.

It is not perfect — I have yet to see a bill that is — but it is a solid first step in at least addressing foreign interference in our democratic processes, especially as we near the next federal election.

Just as “foreign interference” requires a clear definition, so too does understanding how it impacts our democratic processes and what those processes are beyond elections themselves. NSICOP’s report cites key processes including:

the election itself;

nomination processes, including leadership races;

parliamentary business, including parliamentary motions and the legislative process;

campaigns; and

fundraising.

When we talk about foreign interference, especially as parliamentarians, we must recognize that there is much more to a functioning democracy than the specific act of voting.

In understanding how malign foreign actors seek to influence these processes, the NSICOP report states that foreign interference:

. . . undermines the democratic rights and fundamental freedoms of Canadians; the fairness and openness of Canada’s public institutions; the ability of Canadians to make informed decisions and participate in civic discourse; the integrity and credibility of Canada’s parliamentary process; and public trust in the policy decisions made by the government.

So, colleagues, we are not just talking about the possibility of one candidate winning over another with the help of a foreign state, which is certainly bad enough. We are talking about the long-standing, ongoing assault on a fundamental element of our society and the public trust needed to ensure its survival.

Along with the creation of a foreign influence transparency registry and bolstering the ability of CSIS to do its work through amendments to the CSIS Act, as well as increased investment, Bill C-70 is also playing an important role in the public discourse around foreign interference.

Over the more than 11 hours of meeting time last week on the pre-study of Bill C-70 at the National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs Committee, we heard that while there are serious concerns, such as the potential impact on privacy and the right to protest and the rushing through of the bill, there is also general agreement that this legislation is much needed and long overdue.

One problem, as I see it, is that parliamentarians and their staff are not equipped with the knowledge of how to identify foreign interference efforts. As parliamentarians, we often meet with ambassadors and high commissioners and other diplomats, as do members of our staff. That is a normal part of diplomacy and of our roles in this place.

Just as Canadian diplomats abroad work to influence governments and legislators to advance Canada’s national interests and priorities, foreign diplomats accredited to Canada are sent by their countries to try to influence our own policies. However, there are lines that diplomats do not and cannot cross. As with most things, there are grey zones, but it is important to recognize the differences between foreign influence and foreign interference.

In my previous life as a Foreign Service officer for 37 years, especially posted abroad, I engaged with, influenced and sometimes even cajoled others to advance Canada’s interests. Regardless of the goals I was trying to achieve, however, I did not cross any lines.

Acceptable diplomatic conduct involves states engaging in open, transparent and mutually agreed-upon interactions to promote their respective values and national interests, to build alliances and foster international cooperation. These activities are conducted within the framework of international law and norms under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 and its companion, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963.

Canada actively influences other countries in various ways. For example, Canada advocates for ratification of free trade agreements; de-escalation of conflicts and tensions around the world; and advancement of Canadian policy objectives and values, including human rights, women’s political empowerment and LGBTQI+ rights.

Interaction with foreign officials here in Ottawa and on postings abroad was a mainstay of my previous life and has continued in my current one. That is the norm for most, if not all, of us in this room as well as for our staff. Going beyond normal diplomatic activities in an attempt to subvert a sovereign country’s democracy and society, however, is crossing the line between influence and interference. That is why being able to recognize the difference is so important. Unfortunately, there remains a lack of knowledge in this respect.

As much as Bill C-70 will make a difference, it would go that much further if parliamentarians and their staff had the knowledge to empower them to differentiate between foreign influence and interference so they can identify and manage issues.

With all the attention and blandishments we, as parliamentarians, receive from representatives of foreign countries here and on our journeys abroad, it would be in our best interest — and that of our intelligence agencies — to receive detailed briefings. Whether parliamentarians receive classified or even unclassified briefings, unclassified security briefings, at the very least, should be offered to senators’ staff as they are also susceptible to influence and interference tactics.

I know that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS, is willing to provide these briefings. There should also be the possibility to receive unclassified and specific-country briefings as required.

In my previous career, I was frequently a consumer and purveyor of — as well as sometime contributor to — security and intelligence analysis. I know that knowledge is power, colleagues, and I believe that parliamentarians can play a role in helping to combat foreign interference if we are empowered with the tools to do so.

Our country’s business community — specifically the Business Council of Canada — has also advocated for CSIS to communicate more specific and tangible information to Canadian companies. Just as parliamentarians and staff need to understand the growing threat environment, so, too, do business leaders so they can better protect their employees, customers and communities.

Amendments to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, or CSIS Act, outlined in Bill C-70, will allow CSIS to share more with companies than they are currently permitted.

Efforts are not just under way in Canada to combat foreign interference in our own democratic processes but globally, too, with our partners and allies. Colleagues, foreign interference is not a problem unique to Canada. It is one that impacts every liberal democracy around the world. While frustrations about Canada’s response to interference against our own country are justified, it is important to understand that Canada is not the only target. That is why we need to work with our partners and allies around the world to combat the threat we all face.

For example, Canada worked with its G7 partners on a unified approach to countering malign foreign activities at the G7 summit last week in Italy. In the G7 leaders’ communiqué released last week at the end of the summit, leaders acknowledged the threat posed by foreign information manipulation and interference, which now has an acronym: FIMI.

G7 Leaders pledged to strengthen their coordinated efforts to better prevent, detect and respond to foreign interference and will direct their relevant ministers to bolster Charlevoix’s G7 Rapid Response Mechanism by creating, by the end of 2024, a collective response framework to counter foreign threats to democracies, including publicly exposing foreign operations of information manipulation.

Domestic and global efforts to combat foreign interference activities are all well and good, but it is crucial that we can review measures taken to ensure their efficacy or lack thereof. Bill C-70 was amended by the House Committee on Public Safety and National Security to require a comprehensive parliamentary review of this act and its operation not just, as originally planned, after every five-year period but also during the first year after a general election. This is important, colleagues, especially considering the gravity of the threat against our democracy — and the need to see what works and what does not — as well as the concerns of diaspora communities and civil liberties organizations.

As the chair of a committee that undertook a mandated five-year comprehensive review of legislation — that being the Sergei Magnitsky Law and the Special Economic Measures Act — I know that legislative reviews do not necessarily happen just because they are written into law. It is my hope that parliamentarians and, indeed, Canadians can count on the following points: that in the context of the operation of the act in the case of a post-election review, the designated Senate or House committee be required to identify any cases of interference that might have occurred and how they were dealt with, and that members of that committee receive any necessary intelligence briefings and security clearances; and that reports be written in a way that is accessible to the Canadian public — who deserve transparency — especially in matters impacting the functioning of our foundational democratic processes.

Finally, we need a clear understanding of how the success — or failure — of the act and its operation will be measured beyond waiting to see what happens at the next election. The Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs can play an important role in looking at the implementation of Bill C-70 beyond the mandatory reviews, particularly regarding its impact on diaspora communities and civil liberties organizations.

Colleagues, foreign interference must not be subject to hyper-partisanship, as we have all agreed that it is a matter of grave and enduring importance. It also requires creative and modern solutions capable of adapting to constantly developing threats and tactics.

Unfortunately, Canada has long been complacent when it comes to national security. Even 100 years ago, former Quebec senator Raoul Dandurand told the League of Nations that Canadians “live in a fireproof house far from inflammable materials.” Despite the wars and conflicts around the world, the terrorist attacks and cyberattacks and the many humanitarian crises over the past century, Canada has not abandoned its sense of invulnerability.

Bill C-70 is long overdue, colleagues, but it is perhaps finally an acknowledgement that Canada is not invincible and that we, ultimately, are responsible for the security of our own country. Without safeguarding the heart of our society — our very democracy — there will be no country to defend.

Thank you.

Hon. Percy E. Downe: Honourable senators, I just want to say a very few words on Bill C-70 on foreign interference. Obviously, I’m no expert on foreign interference or intelligence, but over the years I have been involved a bit in this area. When I had the honour to serve as chief of staff to Prime Minister Chrétien, my very first day, two people from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service came in, sat down and gave me the intelligence reports from Five Eyes. They explained how everything would work, how the documents would come to me. Then they said, “Today, we’ll sit here. You read them, and we’ll take the documents back.” And then they explained what would happen in the future.

I must tell you, I found that pretty exciting as a kid who grew up in Charlottetown watching James Bond movies to be reading this intelligence. After I read — it took me about 10 minutes — I handed the documents back, and I said, “Tell me the procedure. How does it work?” They said, “Well, the documents go to the Clerk of the Privy Council and to you, and then you have to decide what you’re briefing the Prime Minister on.”

At that point the fun left the room because I didn’t fall off a turnip truck last week. I knew the questions would be, “What did you know? When did you know? What did you do when you knew?” So I said, “Give me those documents back. I want to read them again.” Since then, I’ve been involved for two years reading those documents. Later, as many of you know, I had the honour to serve on the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, the first committee, with Senator Lankin, who is still on it, and David McGuinty, who is the chair.

I just want to say a few words, given my questions to Senator Gold. The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians is an outstanding committee. They have one of the best professional staffs I ever encountered in Ottawa. I’m sure they would have considered every word and every sentence in that report, and they would be extremely careful. I think they serve Canadians well.

Having said that, I decided not to go back on the committee. I did not request to go on the committee when my term was up because I found there were two problems: I was concerned about how much the government was redacting when they released the reports. What we submitted and what they edited out I thought was a step too far. And, quite frankly, having been chief of staff to the Prime Minister, they weren’t getting all the intelligence they should have been getting. They were getting enough to satisfy their responsibilities, but the government wasn’t generous in sharing additional intelligence that I think they would have found helpful.

Having said all that, I’m particularly concerned that we address any erroneous information in the study of Bill C-70, on foreign interference. To that end, I want to speak about what Senator Woo said on Monday. I’m going to quote what he said, and then I’m going to quote the judgment of the case in Australia. I think colleagues can determine if there is a difference between what was stated and what the judge in the case said.

I say this because I’ve always been interested in what the Australians have done in foreign interference. I thought they were the leaders on that file. And I thought they had a bigger problem than we did, they had it earlier, and they addressed it quicker. Having said that, they also have an ongoing problem, and I was intrigued when I heard that someone was actually convicted and sent to jail under the act. That’s why I read the court judgment. For those of you who were around when Senator Baker was here, I do not read court judgments as a hobby. This is one of about half a dozen that I’ve read over the years.

I’ll start with what Senator Woo said on Monday. Here is what he said:

A Vietnamese Australian has been sentenced to two years in jail for the act of preparing or planning an act of foreign interference. What was that act? He organized a fundraiser during COVID, raising money from Vietnamese and Indo-Chinese-Australian communities to buy personal protective equipment and other medical supplies, and he donated that money to a hospital. At the ceremony where the donation was made, he invited a politician — I think he was a sitting minister at the time — to stand with him on the stage holding one of these fake cheques for $25,000 Australian. That was used as evidence that this Vietnamese Australian person was cultivating the minister for a future act of foreign interference.

Just think about that. The Australian system is the Australian system, and they have the right to conduct themselves in the way that they want to. But are we going down the road where someone who develops a relationship with a politician or a public official who may have the potential to rise up the ladder sometime in the near or distant future, that that act in itself is a crime of planning or preparing an act of foreign interference? It drives shivers down the spine.

This is what Senator Woo said on Monday.

Colleagues, I want to compare that to what happened in Australia. This person was tried by a judge and jury. I think it was a five-week trial. I’m only going to quote part of the judgment, but here is what the judge said about this situation. This is Australia, and this is the judge in Australia. He said:

As a prominent and long-serving member of the Liberal Party —

— by that he means, of course, the Australian Liberal Party —

— you had previously met with Minister Tudge on 26 July 2018, at his invitation, to discuss immigration policy. Consistent with the jury’s verdict, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that you sought deliberately to use your previous meeting with Minister Tudge as a means of attracting his interest in becoming involved in the donation to the Royal Melbourne Hospital. I am equally satisfied that, on 30 April 2020, you deliberately selected Minister Tudge as a target of the future foreign influence offence precisely because of Minister Tudge’s political power as a Minister in the Australian Federal Government, and because you believed that he could potentially be persuaded to influence Australian Government policy in a manner favourable to the Chinese Communist Party. On your assessment, the attraction of this potential benefit was enhanced by your stated belief that Minister Tudge would, in the future, become the Prime Minister of Australia.

Later he said:

In representing your purposes for the donation as being purely altruistic and genuine, you deceived the intended target, Minister Tudge, as well as members of Minister Tudge’s office staff, members of the Royal Melbourne Hospital associated with the donation, and members of the Oceania Federation who donated funds with no ulterior motive. The prosecution submits that this aspect of your conduct involved a significant breach of the trust of members of the Oceania Federation and of the Liberal Party by using your longstanding affiliation with those bodies as a form of cover in prosecuting the agenda of the Chinese Communist Party. Indeed, as the evidence at the trial amply demonstrated, such covert methodology was a feature of what is known as the United Front Work System, which is employed worldwide by the so-called United Front Work Department which operates under the direction and control of the Chinese Communist Party. I accept those submissions and find the facts that underpin them proved beyond reasonable doubt.

The judge then goes on to say:

I also find to that same standard that you maintained contact prior to and during the offending period with Chinese Communist Party officials both in Australia and overseas. You communicated with them over the encrypted WeChat application, including with officials whom you knew or believed were operatives of the Chinese Government Ministry of State Security. The extent to which you were trusted by the Chinese Communist Party was evidenced by your relationship with the Chinese consulate and was reflected in your invitation from the Chinese Communist Party to attend the 70th Anniversary National Day Celebrations in Beijing. You duly attended those celebrations in Beijing on 1 October 2019.

The evidence led at the trial supports the conclusion that the United Front Work System, as operated by the United Front Work Department, is a sophisticated, far-reaching and pervasive foreign influence program. The Prosecution submits that your offending, and your conduct both before and after the period of the offence, suggests that you were an adept exponent of the methodology of that System. You demonstrated an aptitude and enthusiasm for developing relationships with persons of influence in Australia and overseas and for hiding your connections with the Chinese Communist Party behind your roles in apparently innocuous community organisations. The prosecution submits that, in these respects, your offending may be regarded as sophisticated. I accept that submission and find the underlying facts proved beyond reasonable doubt.

The prosecution argued that the accused had been in contact with Chinese state officials. There were various wiretapped phone calls played in court, including one where he was heard telling an associate, “When I do things it never gets reported in the newspaper, but Beijing will know what I’m doing.” They convicted him, and that’s the other side of the story.

Thank you, colleagues.

Hon. Hassan Yussuff: Honourable senators, I rise today to speak, of course, to Bill C-70, the countering foreign interference act.

We have spent the past years watching and reading in real time about foreign countries meddling in our elections, threatening the diaspora community on Canadian soil and targeting, of course, our members of Parliament. We have read public reports detailing the scope and breadth of this ongoing interference, and it has shaken us. It has reminded us of the paramount importance of protecting the security we so often take for granted. Bill C-70, while imperfect, takes an important first step in addressing these concerns.

By now, you have heard colleagues describe the various provisions of Bill C-70 in depth: the important and necessary changes that it makes to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, the Security of Information Act, and the Criminal Code, as well as the proposed enactment of the foreign influence transparency and accountability act, which would create a foreign agent registry.

I intend to focus my remarks on three concerns that have arisen during the National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs Committee’s study of this very important bill.

First and foremost, foreign interference in our domestic process is unacceptable and needs to be addressed immediately, particularly in the context of a looming federal election. While I admit that Bill C-70 is imperfect and will require ongoing study, we must pass it now to ensure it can be implemented in time for the next federal election.

At the same time, we must also balance our security needs with the protection of our Charter rights of expression and association. Concerns about the broad scope of certain definitions concerning protest in Bill C-70 must be addressed.

Finally, we must also ensure that our national security and the integrity of our elections remain a non-partisan issue. It is imperative that all parties and groups come together to create the best national security regime we can with the tools we have available in the moment, which — I believe — Bill C-70 accomplishes. The need for compromise is a feature — not a bug — of Canadian democracy. It is essential if we are to combat threats posed by countries that do not hold our regard for democracy.

As Canadians, we face a wide range of security threats: threats to our economy, infrastructure, research, cybersecurity, the integrity of our electoral processes and the very functioning of our government.

The first concern I want to raise is the urgency of passing Bill C-70.

In the context of such wide-ranging threats, it is important that we get the timing right. I have heard the frustrations of my colleagues that more could and should have been done sooner to combat the threat of foreign interference. I share many of their frustrations and have said so publicly and also at the committee hearings.

No matter what should have been done in the past, we must deal with the solutions we have in front of us now. I believe Bill C-70 is an important first step of that solution and that we must pass it with the urgency it requires. Canadians demand it, demand no more.

Last week, our committee heard from many witnesses across political lines and in various corners of government and civil society about the need for the swift passage of this bill.

Activists from Hong Kong Watch and the Canada Tibet Committee, facing considerable risk just by testifying publicly to the transnational repression they face daily, urged for the speedy passage of Bill C-70.

Richard Fadden, former director of CSIS and National Security and Intelligence Advisor to Prime Minister Harper and Prime Minister Trudeau at one time, urged the rapid passage of the bill, stating in his committee appearance:

To delay Bill C-70 to the point that it will not be in place before the next election would be a gift to our adversaries. . . .

I’m inclined to agree with him.

The government has told us that if the bill is passed now, they will work to implement the foreign agent registry in time for the next election.

Following the appointment of a new foreign influence transparency commissioner to administer the act, Canadians can have faith that malicious foreign actors can and will be held responsible for violating Canadian law. Canadians can have faith that the integrity of our democratic processes will be protected.

Senators, it is possible to support the swift passage of this bill and to acknowledge that its implementation will require ongoing oversight. This is my second concern.

Our committee heard from the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, or CCLA, who shared concerns that the sabotage provisions outlined in proposed section 52.1(1) of the Criminal Code, as outlined in Bill C-70, are too broad as written and will require clarification.

As it currently stands, the provision only concerns the sabotage of essential infrastructure and does not, according to the CCLA, “. . . have a foreign interference element and can apply to wholly domestic matters.”

Senators, this is deeply concerning, as we want to ensure distinctions are made between legitimate domestic protests and nefarious foreign obstruction of our critical infrastructure. The government has acknowledged these concerns and has stressed that targeting domestic protesters is not the goal of this bill.

True as that may be, I am concerned that future governments are likely to take advantage of this lack of clarity and that legitimate protesters like union members — I used to be involved in union protests — or First Nations members could find themselves in the crosshairs.

There is a need to clearly define what constitutes a threat to the “safety, security or defence of Canada” and what the government considers “essential infrastructure.” I fear that without this clarity, this section of the law will be ripe for potential abuse by future governments at any level.

The Canadian Civil Liberties Association are not the only ones concerned with this proposed section of the bill. Our committee also heard from the University of Ottawa professor Michael Kempa, who suggested, “Underlining the language around the necessity for foreign involvement or interference driving that activity would safeguard domestic protest.”

I’m inclined to agree, senators. I think the section in its current form is too broadly encompassing. Having said that, I still believe we should pass this bill to ensure the foreign agent registry has a fighting chance of being implemented before the next federal election.

Does that mean we simply drop these issues? I am confident that senators in this chamber and in committees will continue to study the implementation of this bill to ensure that our fundamental rights are protected alongside our national security.

Senators, my final concern is that election integrity and national security should be consensus-based and non-partisan issues.

Our committee heard from witnesses who are members of the other place and who are satisfied that Bill C-70 takes a balanced, substantive approach to national security that is supported by all parties in the other place.

Both the Conservative MP Michael Chong and the Liberal Minister of Justice Arif Virani called attention to the rare nature of the all-party support for Bill C-70 in the other place. Minister Virani told our committee that this is because “. . . all parties in the House of Commons feel the necessity of proceeding with pace in respect to this legislation.” Mr. Chong echoed his sentiments, telling us that this consensus is the result of “. . . how serious members of the House of Commons see the threats to the elected house and to our elections.”

Colleagues, we must continue to work on this issue from a consensus standpoint on the substance of the issue. Many of the anti-democratic countries interfering with our national security do not hold regular elections and are thus not making major policy changes every four years. To successfully combat foreign interference, a non-partisan approach requiring deliberation, mutual agreement and some compromise on all sides is the path forward.

Senators, in conclusion, as you have heard me and others say in this chamber, Bill C-70 has many strengths and some weaknesses. It is not a perfect bill, but it is an important step toward addressing the threat of foreign interference in Canada.

I want to thank Minister Virani and Minister LeBlanc for appearing before the Standing Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs to testify on this issue. I also want to thank our dear colleague Senator Dean for his skilled sponsorship of this bill and my dear friend Senator Dagenais for his sound management of the committee as we heard witnesses testify to the impacts of Bill C-70.

Honourable colleagues, if I can digress for a minute, I have a name, Hassan Yussuff. After 9/11 happened, our country — like many other countries around the world — acted to bring forth laws that were necessary based on what we witnessed after 9/11. The unintended consequence of that law was that when I went to the airport, I was always selected to be scrutinized.

I can tell you that in my past life, in my past job, I went through airports 10 to 20 times a week. That was my job. I travelled the country to meet with my members and talk with them. I understood that it was the consequence of that law and that prejudice is hard to overcome. How do you train people when you pass a law that says that you should not do that because the person looks like the person you may think? This is a reality of human behaviour, and we need to acknowledge it because if we don’t, we don’t understand the complexity of our country and how we build unity.

My second point is that Maher Arar did not rendition himself in Syria to be tortured. He was renditioned by the officials in our security system who targeted him because they believed he was a threat to our security. He did survive that interrogation and subsequently called home. As you may recall, there was a national inquiry that looked into it, and cautioned and guided us about how not to do the same thing again. I understand that, because for many, if we forget that, we forget our own history and how we can do better.

Third, many Muslim families had nothing to do with the security risks to our country but found the names of their children on a watch list. These were kids who had nothing to do with terrorism but could not get themselves off that list. It took a significant amount of time for our country to finally do the right thing, because we didn’t create the list.

My point is that good intentions are good intentions. However, we are a country that is very diverse, as is this chamber. We all want to do the right thing — to protect our great, wonderful country — but in doing so, we should also be conscious of how some people can at times be targeted just because of how they look and what they say.

It is an imperfect bill in some ways. However, I believe this chamber can do what it is famous for, which is to continue to do its work in examining the implementation of the legislation and regulations, as well as bringing the commissioner before our committee to testify in regard to how they will do their job in enforcing the law. If we see the flaws early enough, we should not hesitate to act collectively, because our national security cannot be protected if we divide our country.

Colleagues, I will conclude. I want to thank the countless activists and brave ordinary citizens working to combat the threat of foreign interference. We have had the pleasure of hearing from some of them. As we continue our work studying the issue, we hope to hear from many more.

This bill is trying to address some of their concerns because of what they face every single day. However, this bill is also for Canadians collectively and the nation we represent. We will do the right thing when we pass it, but let me be clear: I want to thank my colleague Senator Woo for what he said in this chamber; it took courage to do so. We should not be so quick to judge, because people have accused him of things that I don’t believe he —

[Translation]

Hon. Leo Housakos: Honourable colleagues, I have shared my view on foreign interference for a very long time, both in this chamber and elsewhere, and I’m pleased in the last couple of weeks there has been a surge on the part of the government and all colleagues to start dealing with this existential crisis that we’re facing.

Unlike Senator Cardozo, I don’t think this is a very complicated issue. This is a very simple issue. Unfortunately, there are various elements for a variety of reasons that complicate a very simple issue.

I also don’t agree with my good friend Senator McPhedran that we’re rushing this for political expediency reasons. We are rushing this because what’s at stake is the credibility of our electoral process and the reputation of our democracy, which has been blemished because of foreign interference over at least the last two elections that we know of based on tangible reports — from the preliminary report from the public inquiry, from a report from the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, or NSICOP, that dates back as far as 2018 from our colleagues that were raising red flags as well as, of course, from reports that started as far back as 2013, which highlighted foreign interference in our democracy and our Parliament.

I can easily say that probably it was political expediency that has taken so long for us to deal with this existential crisis because I agree with you that we should have been dealing with this in thorough debate and discussion at various committees, particularly in the Senate. The Senate, if there is a place where we can have an added value, is to take these types of issues out of the political arena, take a step back, take a deep breath, in conjunction with our national security agencies, with our Five Eyes allies, with our members at NSICOP who have a particular experience and figure out, number one, what is wrong with the structure we have in place with regard to national security and foreign interference. Unfortunately, for many years — and it’s not the fault of this government; it is many governments — all roads that deal with national security lead to one person only, and that’s in the Prime Minister’s Office. That opens the door, of course, for partisanship, particularly when it comes to the interference of the electoral process.

I’m not saying I have the solution in one swoop, and I don’t think this bill has the solution to the problem either. It’s one giant step forward because it does put on guard various nefarious actors around the world who think that Canada is very porous — and we have been very porous. When we read the preliminary report from Justice Hogue vis-à-vis the public inquiry, she makes it clear. We don’t need to wait until the end of the year to read the rest of the report. If you read the preliminary report, it’s frightening what comes out of that report.

When we hear what has leaked out of the reports from NSICOP that has gone to the Prime Minister, it’s frightening. It calls into question this very institution, the lower chamber and our electoral process.

Now the government finds itself behind the eight ball, racing to put into place a bill that will at least hopefully be in place in the next 12 or 14 months, before the next election, to give Elections Canada, the RCMP and political parties the flexibility they need to make sure that our democratic process withstands the test of time.

As you all know, I’m rather partisan and involved in political organizations, and I can tell you that there is no doubt there has been foreign interference in our elections. We fight it within our party ranks. We see all parties dealing with it. I don’t think it had, thank God, enough of an impact to affect the overall results of the last two elections. There is no doubt about that. But we have to make sure that if we don’t take the necessary steps to protect future elections, it might have a greater impact in the future.

Regardless of which political parties win or lose elections, one thing that distinguishes us as a democracy is we come to this place, we have robust and vigorous debates about left-wing policies, right-wing policies, being Liberal, being Conservative and we have acrimonious discussions very often, but the beauty of all this is every few years, when the general public speaks and makes decisions, we all respect those decisions. We go back home, we have a beer, we have our dinner and we go back at it a week later. That’s the beauty of a democracy.

We don’t take our opponents and put them in prison. We don’t take our opponents and execute them in public executions. We aren’t so dogmatic about our political views that when we disagree with people, we throw them off rooftops and murder them. That is what is happening in various places around the world. There are a lot of nefarious regimes around the world that don’t afford their citizens the same privileges and rights that we have in this country.

We sometimes take it for granted. All of us who follow foreign affairs a little bit, we should all recognize that over the last two decades, democracy is in decline. If you look at Democracy Watch and other organizations — I know, Senator McPhedran, that you’re very active on foreign affairs — democracy is weaker today than it was 25 years ago. It’s weaker today than it was 15 years ago. If we’re not vigilant, we have seen, through the history of time, that most democracies don’t get attacked and defeated from the outside. They wither away from the inside.

The real forces of evil and enemies are trying to infiltrate the Western democracies that have afforded us and billions of people around the world the best quality of life, and Canada is an example of that. Where I do agree with Senator Cardozo is that Canada has been a magnet because of that for people from all over the world.

You look at this chamber. I don’t think there is any other democratic parliamentary chamber as diverse as this chamber and as representative of this country — there is no other country in the world. Why have we achieved that? Because of one thing we all agree upon. We might disagree about you being independent. We might disagree about me not being too independent enough and so on and so forth, but what we all agree on is that our freedom, our democracy, human rights and the rule of law are not negotiable.