SoVote

Decentralized Democracy

Hon. Michael Chong

  • Member of Parliament
  • Member of the panel of chairs for the legislative committees
  • Conservative
  • Wellington—Halton Hills
  • Ontario
  • Voting Attendance: 62%
  • Expenses Last Quarter: $120,269.09

  • Government Page
  • Jun/12/24 4:39:24 p.m.
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  • Re: Bill C-70 
Madam Speaker, now that Bill C-70 is back in the House for third reading, I would like to take this opportunity to outline the long journey it took to get to this point. In 2018, the director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, David Vigneault, advised the government about threats presented by the People's Republic of China. That year, he warned the Prime Minister that PRC activities related to the threat of foreign interference were an existential threat for Parliament and the elections. Also in 2018, the government was advised that the measures then in place were not sufficient to counter these threats to Parliament and to our elections. We know that because it was the second finding of fact on page 73 of the NSICOP report. Also back in 2018, national security agencies advised the government to introduce a range of measures to counter these threats, including new legislation. It is also notable that in 2018, the CSIS director also advised the government of another threat from the PRC, which was the threat of espionage. We know that because, for the first time ever, the director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service gave a public speech in December of that year. In that speech, he warned of serious threats from the PRC closely related to foreign interference, which were those of espionage. These threats came in the form of espionage targeting Canadian companies and Canadian universities in the five sensitive areas he outlined at that time: artificial intelligence, quantum computing, 5G telecommunications technology, biopharma and clean tech. Subsequently, in 2019, the Clerk of the Privy Council sought the Prime Minister's approval for an action plan to protect Parliament and our elections. The Prime Minister did not approve that plan. Again, a year later, in December 2020, the national security and intelligence adviser to the Prime Minister sought the Prime Minister's approval again for that action plan to protect Parliament and our elections. Again, the Prime Minister did not approve the plan. For the third time, in February 2022, the national security and intelligence adviser resurrected this initiative, and again, the Prime Minister did not approve an action plan. In all three occasions over several years, the Prime Minister did not approve actions that would have protected Parliament and our elections. On November 18, 2020, the House adopted a motion calling on the government to produce a robust plan to counter foreign interference threat activities here on Canadian soil. Despite all of this advice, despite the call of the House of Commons to the government to enact a robust plan to counter foreign interference and to take additional measures to protect Canadian democracy, little was done. Then, because the Prime Minister did not approve actions to protect Parliament and our elections, and because the government failed to heed the call of the House in the motion adopted on November 18, 2020, foreign interference threats increased from 2018 to present. As Justice Hogue said in her initial report of May 3, the risk from the impacts of foreign interference will only increase as long as “sufficient protective measures to guard against it” are not taken. Then, subsequent to all of this, in the fall of 2022, explosive media reports about foreign interference threats broke. These reports raised questions about what the Prime Minister knew, when he knew it and why he did not act on the intelligence and the advice he was given by the senior civil service. Further explosive revelations in the subsequent months followed in the media. Finally, on March 6, 2023, the government promised to look at introducing measures in law to counter these threats. It took years for the government to take the advice of CSIS, the senior civil service and countless reports. It took years for the government to introduce legislation. Finally, after much urging, many controversies and a lot of work done by a great many people, the government reluctantly introduced Bill C‑70. That brings us to the debate today on Bill C-70 at third reading. Bill C-70 is a much-needed response to the existential threat to our democracy from foreign interference. It would modernize the CSIS Act, allowing CSIS to better obtain preservation and production orders, and national security warrants for obtaining information, records or documents, through a single attempt. It would better allow CSIS to collect, retain and analyze data for intelligence purposes. It would allow CSIS to collect foreign intelligence and to disclose classified information outside of the Government of Canada to provinces, municipalities, universities, companies and individuals being targeted. It would create new criminal offences for those who would engage in foreign interference here in Canada on behalf of a foreign state, ensuring that we could better protect Canadians against these corrosive, clandestine, corrupting and coercive activities, especially Canadians in diaspora communities who have suffered for so long in silence and isolation. It would also make it easier to prosecute these offences by removing the requirement to prove harm to the interests of Canada when a Canadian is targeted by foreign interference. It would create a new criminal offence that would better protect essential infrastructure in Canada, including stiff penalties for those who would sabotage essential infrastructure on behalf of a foreign state or a foreign government. It would amend the Canada Evidence Act and would make consequential to other acts so that it would allow information relating to foreign affairs, national defence or national security in Federal Court proceedings to be better handled. Finally, the bill would establish a foreign influence, transparency and accountability act, which would create a foreign influence registry and a new foreign influence transparency commissioner. The new foreign influence transparency commissioner would oversee a public registry containing information on individuals in Canada engaged in legitimate influence activities on behalf of a foreign principal. The bill was strengthened in committee, particularly with respect to the appointment of a commissioner. The commissioner would be appointed by the Governor in Council after consultation with leaders in the House of Commons and in the Senate, and after resolutions in the House of Commons and in the Senate are adopted. This would ensure that while the commissioner is situated within the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, within the machinery of government, the commissioner would have a degree of independence to manage and to interpret the act, to issue notices of compliance, to issue administrative monetary penalties and to refer matters to law enforcement for criminal prosecution. Time is of the essence. We must ensure that our democratic institutions and elections are protected from the threats of foreign interference. Inaction and delay cannot continue. As Justice Hogue noted in her initial report, the risk of the impacts from foreign interference will only increase as long as “sufficient protective measures to guard against it” are not taken. She also concluded that “foreign interference in the 2019 and 2021 [general] elections” undermined “public confidence in Canada's democracy”. As the general election draws closer, time is running out to strengthen the confidence Canadians have in our elections. Time is running out to combat the rising threat of foreign interference. Canadians need to be able to go to the polls in the next election and to be confident not only in the integrity of the overall election but also in the integrity of each of the elections that take place in each of the 338 electoral districts in Canada. This bill must pass, and I encourage all of my parliamentary colleagues, in this place and in the other place, to support this bill and to see its adoption into law before we adjourn for the summer.
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  • May/29/24 5:11:01 p.m.
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  • Re: Bill C-70 
Mr. Speaker, I believe if you seek it, you will find unanimous consent for the following motion, which would see the bill voted on at third reading by Wednesday, June 12, at end of day. That, notwithstanding any standing order, special order or usual practice of the House, Bill C-70, an act respecting countering foreign interference, shall be disposed of as follows: (a) at the expiry of the time provided for government orders later today, the bill would be deemed adopted at second reading and referred to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security; (b) during the consideration of the bill by the committee: (1) the committee shall have the first priority for the use of House resources for committee meetings; (2) the committee shall meet for extended hours on Monday, June 3; Tuesday, June 4; Wednesday, June 5; and Thursday, June 6, to gather evidence from witnesses; (3) the Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs, the officials from the RCMP and CSIS, the national security and intelligence adviser to the Prime Minister, the officials from the Department of Public Safety and other expert witnesses deemed relevant by the committee be invited to appear; (4) all amendments be submitted to the clerk of the committee by 9 a.m. on Monday, June 10; (5) amendments filed by independent members shall be deemed to have been proposed during the clause-by-clause consideration of the bill; (6) the committee shall meet at 3.30 p.m. on Monday, June 10—
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  • May/29/24 5:07:43 p.m.
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Mr. Speaker, there are measures in this bill that will give CSIS the power to disclose classified information to universities, municipalities and provinces to ensure that they have the information they need to protect their interests. We support this measure. We think it is very important to give our national security agencies the power to do that.
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  • May/9/24 10:59:44 a.m.
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Mr. Speaker, I believe that Justice Hogue's initial report is a good start. She will present a second report in December of this year. I will continue working with the commission to ensure that the second report is very strong and contains solid recommendations for building a national security system that will protect our democratic institutions. I also agree that the government must act. The director of CSIS sounded the alarm in 2018 when he publicly announced that there was a national security problem here in Canada, specifically in relation to the People's Republic of China. That was six or seven years ago. The government dragged its feet over proposing a measure or taking action. As my hon. NDP colleague said, they took too long introducing a bill aimed at creating a registry of foreign agents. A lot more needs to be done, and I think that the government needs to do these things.
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  • Feb/29/24 2:21:08 p.m.
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Mr. Speaker, the documents reveal a shocking disregard for Canada's national security. They reveal a government that is completely asleep at the switch on national security and the machinery of government. They reveal government employees collaborating with Beijing's government and with the biological weapons unit of the People's Liberation Army. Equally shocking are the health minister's comments. He said yesterday that there was no evidence of actual breaches at the lab and that no sensitive information actually left the country. The documents say otherwise. Does the minister stand by those comments?
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  • Feb/26/24 3:07:50 p.m.
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Mr. Speaker, the four MPs on the Winnipeg lab committee found that most of the information the government withheld from Parliament was withheld to shield the Prime Minister and ministers from embarrassment rather than to protect national security. These four MPs, including a Liberal member, recommended that the majority of the information withheld by the government be made public. Will the government finally admit that its decision to withhold documents from Parliament was not to protect national security, but rather to protect itself from political embarrassment?
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  • May/8/23 4:06:31 p.m.
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Mr. Speaker, this is an important question. I am very concerned about the weakening of Canada's national security and intelligence system, the intelligence community, because of what has taken place over the last several months. I would add that it is not primarily the decision of CSIS whether or not to inform members of foreign interference threat activities. It is primarily the responsibility of the Prime Minister; an open and accountable government is clear. The Prime Minister has primary responsibility among all ministers for national security. The Prime Minister is primarily responsible for the government's relationship to Parliament. What has clearly broken down here is the direction from the Prime Minister to direct his intelligence community, departments and central agencies to inform members of Parliament and their families, in an appropriate manner, about foreign interference threat activities. He has indicated that this will now happen going forward, but it should have happened as soon as he was appointed to office, in early November 2015.
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  • May/4/23 4:14:02 p.m.
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Madam Speaker, I thank my hon. colleague for his very important question. It is beyond belief that the Prime Minister would structure the government in a way that prevents the Prime Minister from knowing what is going on with national security. It is absolutely incredible that the Prime Minister set things up this way. It really shakes me to the core, and should shake Canadians to the core, that, clearly, the national security of this country is not a concern of the Prime Minister or the government.
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  • May/4/23 4:12:33 p.m.
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Madam Speaker, the Prime Minister is responsible for ensuring that he sets up the machinery of government and the broad organizational structure of the government to ensure that he is informed about national security issues. The Prime Minister is responsible for the government's relationship to this place, Parliament. The fact that the Prime Minister set things up in such a way that he did not know is shocking. It is like the head of a government of a G7 country saying to the chief of the defence staff for the armed forces that he does not actually want to know if there is an intrusion into our airspace. It is like saying, “I don't want to know when that happens; don't bother telling me.” That is essentially what has happened here, with the Prime Minister setting things up in such a way that he was not informed about these things.
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  • May/4/23 2:24:25 p.m.
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Mr. Speaker, CSIS has been advising the government, the departments, the Privy Council Office, the national security adviser and deputy ministers that foreign agents in Canada, foreign diplomats in Canada, are presenting a threat to Canadian MPs in the House of Commons. In fact, the 2022 intelligence report from CSIS today says, “These threat actors must be held accountable for their clandestine activities.... We will also continue to inform national security stakeholders and all Canadians about foreign interference”. Why is the government not listening to the advice of CSIS and not listening to the advice in the reports that are being distributed?
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  • Apr/18/23 3:09:10 p.m.
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All that has happened, Mr. Speaker, to this point is that the RCMP has parked police cars at these illegal stations, and that is not good enough. The government has had years to counter what CSIS has called a serious national threat to the security of Canada, but nothing has happened: no prosecution of anyone involved with these illegal foreign interference activities; no prosecution of anyone for these illegal police stations; no legislation introduced to counter Beijing's agents; no diplomats expelled. Why does it take the U.S.A. to protect Canadians and Canadian sovereignty on Canadian soil?
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  • Mar/20/23 5:01:56 p.m.
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Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for her question. I think that Beijing poses a real threat to our post-secondary institutions. CSIS has identified that Beijing is a threat in five areas of research and development. It is a threat to our national security and a threat to our intellectual property in the five areas of clean tech, artificial intelligence, biopharma, 5G telecommunications and quantum computing. However, the government has failed to take action to protect the post-secondary research institutions that my hon. colleague referred to. It has failed to provide a directive ordering the CIHR, the CFI, the SSHRC and NSERC, the four granting councils, to ban funding in partnership with entities in the People's Republic of China in these five sensitive areas. That is why we have been lax in protecting our national security. More broadly, the government has failed to step up when it comes to protecting the cybersecurity of Canadians. In the last election, we saw the case of candidate Kenny Chiu, who was the subject of a volume of disinformation that Global Affairs Canada's G7 rapid response mechanism was tracking. The SITE task force failed to release this disinformation during the election to ensure that Kenny Chiu at least had a fighting chance to counter it.
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  • Feb/21/22 4:04:19 p.m.
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Madam Speaker, three of the safeguards that have been put into the act are the three criteria that the government must meet in order to trigger a public order emergency. The first is a threat or the actual use of violence to achieve a political, religious or ideological objective. The second is a threat to the health, safety and lives of Canadians that is beyond the capacity of a province to deal with, or alternatively that there is a threat to the sovereignty, territorial integrity or security of this country. The last is that there is no other law in Canada, federal or provincial, that could effectively deal with the situation. Those three criteria are safeguards in preventing intrusions into civil liberties.
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