Hon. Peter M. Boehm: Honourable senators, I rise to speak to Bill C-70, the countering foreign interference act.

Much has been said already, but given the seriousness of the subject matter and its impact on a foundational element of Canadian society, namely our very democracy, I wish to add my voice to this important debate.

The revelations in the Special Report on Foreign Interference in Canada’s Democratic Processes and Institutions released recently by the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, also known as NSICOP, were unsettling. It demonstrates that Canadians, least of all the government and parliamentarians, can no longer sit back and turn a blind eye to interference by foreign states in our democratic processes.

As the report revealed, current and former elected officials have wittingly colluded with foreign governments against Canada’s national interests. Despite its domination of the news cycle lately, foreign interference against Canada and other countries has been a problem for decades.

There has been much debate and frustration over the timing of this bill because, after years of ignoring a clear and present danger, it is both only coming now and is being rushed through Parliament in only a few weeks.

One thing all parliamentarians and Canadians agree on is that Canada needs to finally start taking seriously the significant national security threat of foreign interference. That is what Bill C-70 aims to do.

It is not perfect — I have yet to see a bill that is — but it is a solid first step in at least addressing foreign interference in our democratic processes, especially as we near the next federal election.

Just as “foreign interference” requires a clear definition, so too does understanding how it impacts our democratic processes and what those processes are beyond elections themselves. NSICOP’s report cites key processes including:

the election itself;

nomination processes, including leadership races;

parliamentary business, including parliamentary motions and the legislative process;

campaigns; and

fundraising.

When we talk about foreign interference, especially as parliamentarians, we must recognize that there is much more to a functioning democracy than the specific act of voting.

In understanding how malign foreign actors seek to influence these processes, the NSICOP report states that foreign interference:

. . . undermines the democratic rights and fundamental freedoms of Canadians; the fairness and openness of Canada’s public institutions; the ability of Canadians to make informed decisions and participate in civic discourse; the integrity and credibility of Canada’s parliamentary process; and public trust in the policy decisions made by the government.

So, colleagues, we are not just talking about the possibility of one candidate winning over another with the help of a foreign state, which is certainly bad enough. We are talking about the long-standing, ongoing assault on a fundamental element of our society and the public trust needed to ensure its survival.

Along with the creation of a foreign influence transparency registry and bolstering the ability of CSIS to do its work through amendments to the CSIS Act, as well as increased investment, Bill C-70 is also playing an important role in the public discourse around foreign interference.

Over the more than 11 hours of meeting time last week on the pre-study of Bill C-70 at the National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs Committee, we heard that while there are serious concerns, such as the potential impact on privacy and the right to protest and the rushing through of the bill, there is also general agreement that this legislation is much needed and long overdue.

One problem, as I see it, is that parliamentarians and their staff are not equipped with the knowledge of how to identify foreign interference efforts. As parliamentarians, we often meet with ambassadors and high commissioners and other diplomats, as do members of our staff. That is a normal part of diplomacy and of our roles in this place.

Just as Canadian diplomats abroad work to influence governments and legislators to advance Canada’s national interests and priorities, foreign diplomats accredited to Canada are sent by their countries to try to influence our own policies. However, there are lines that diplomats do not and cannot cross. As with most things, there are grey zones, but it is important to recognize the differences between foreign influence and foreign interference.

In my previous life as a Foreign Service officer for 37 years, especially posted abroad, I engaged with, influenced and sometimes even cajoled others to advance Canada’s interests. Regardless of the goals I was trying to achieve, however, I did not cross any lines.

Acceptable diplomatic conduct involves states engaging in open, transparent and mutually agreed-upon interactions to promote their respective values and national interests, to build alliances and foster international cooperation. These activities are conducted within the framework of international law and norms under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 and its companion, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963.

Canada actively influences other countries in various ways. For example, Canada advocates for ratification of free trade agreements; de-escalation of conflicts and tensions around the world; and advancement of Canadian policy objectives and values, including human rights, women’s political empowerment and LGBTQI+ rights.

Interaction with foreign officials here in Ottawa and on postings abroad was a mainstay of my previous life and has continued in my current one. That is the norm for most, if not all, of us in this room as well as for our staff. Going beyond normal diplomatic activities in an attempt to subvert a sovereign country’s democracy and society, however, is crossing the line between influence and interference. That is why being able to recognize the difference is so important. Unfortunately, there remains a lack of knowledge in this respect.

As much as Bill C-70 will make a difference, it would go that much further if parliamentarians and their staff had the knowledge to empower them to differentiate between foreign influence and interference so they can identify and manage issues.

With all the attention and blandishments we, as parliamentarians, receive from representatives of foreign countries here and on our journeys abroad, it would be in our best interest — and that of our intelligence agencies — to receive detailed briefings. Whether parliamentarians receive classified or even unclassified briefings, unclassified security briefings, at the very least, should be offered to senators’ staff as they are also susceptible to influence and interference tactics.

I know that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS, is willing to provide these briefings. There should also be the possibility to receive unclassified and specific-country briefings as required.

In my previous career, I was frequently a consumer and purveyor of — as well as sometime contributor to — security and intelligence analysis. I know that knowledge is power, colleagues, and I believe that parliamentarians can play a role in helping to combat foreign interference if we are empowered with the tools to do so.

Our country’s business community — specifically the Business Council of Canada — has also advocated for CSIS to communicate more specific and tangible information to Canadian companies. Just as parliamentarians and staff need to understand the growing threat environment, so, too, do business leaders so they can better protect their employees, customers and communities.

Amendments to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, or CSIS Act, outlined in Bill C-70, will allow CSIS to share more with companies than they are currently permitted.

Efforts are not just under way in Canada to combat foreign interference in our own democratic processes but globally, too, with our partners and allies. Colleagues, foreign interference is not a problem unique to Canada. It is one that impacts every liberal democracy around the world. While frustrations about Canada’s response to interference against our own country are justified, it is important to understand that Canada is not the only target. That is why we need to work with our partners and allies around the world to combat the threat we all face.

For example, Canada worked with its G7 partners on a unified approach to countering malign foreign activities at the G7 summit last week in Italy. In the G7 leaders’ communiqué released last week at the end of the summit, leaders acknowledged the threat posed by foreign information manipulation and interference, which now has an acronym: FIMI.

G7 Leaders pledged to strengthen their coordinated efforts to better prevent, detect and respond to foreign interference and will direct their relevant ministers to bolster Charlevoix’s G7 Rapid Response Mechanism by creating, by the end of 2024, a collective response framework to counter foreign threats to democracies, including publicly exposing foreign operations of information manipulation.

Domestic and global efforts to combat foreign interference activities are all well and good, but it is crucial that we can review measures taken to ensure their efficacy or lack thereof. Bill C-70 was amended by the House Committee on Public Safety and National Security to require a comprehensive parliamentary review of this act and its operation not just, as originally planned, after every five-year period but also during the first year after a general election. This is important, colleagues, especially considering the gravity of the threat against our democracy — and the need to see what works and what does not — as well as the concerns of diaspora communities and civil liberties organizations.

As the chair of a committee that undertook a mandated five-year comprehensive review of legislation — that being the Sergei Magnitsky Law and the Special Economic Measures Act — I know that legislative reviews do not necessarily happen just because they are written into law. It is my hope that parliamentarians and, indeed, Canadians can count on the following points: that in the context of the operation of the act in the case of a post-election review, the designated Senate or House committee be required to identify any cases of interference that might have occurred and how they were dealt with, and that members of that committee receive any necessary intelligence briefings and security clearances; and that reports be written in a way that is accessible to the Canadian public — who deserve transparency — especially in matters impacting the functioning of our foundational democratic processes.

Finally, we need a clear understanding of how the success — or failure — of the act and its operation will be measured beyond waiting to see what happens at the next election. The Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs can play an important role in looking at the implementation of Bill C-70 beyond the mandatory reviews, particularly regarding its impact on diaspora communities and civil liberties organizations.

Colleagues, foreign interference must not be subject to hyper-partisanship, as we have all agreed that it is a matter of grave and enduring importance. It also requires creative and modern solutions capable of adapting to constantly developing threats and tactics.

Unfortunately, Canada has long been complacent when it comes to national security. Even 100 years ago, former Quebec senator Raoul Dandurand told the League of Nations that Canadians “live in a fireproof house far from inflammable materials.” Despite the wars and conflicts around the world, the terrorist attacks and cyberattacks and the many humanitarian crises over the past century, Canada has not abandoned its sense of invulnerability.

Bill C-70 is long overdue, colleagues, but it is perhaps finally an acknowledgement that Canada is not invincible and that we, ultimately, are responsible for the security of our own country. Without safeguarding the heart of our society — our very democracy — there will be no country to defend.

Thank you.

Hon. Yuen Pau Woo: Honourable senators, let me start by thanking my friend Senator Dean for his wise stewardship of the bill and my friend Senator Dagenais for allowing me to sit in on meetings of the Standing Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs during the pre-study as an observer.

Colleagues, earlier today you will have received notice that I will move an amendment to Bill C-70 to remove the phrase “in association with” from the bill. Before I do so, let me take a few minutes to explain why I think it is necessary.

There are six references to that phrase in both Part 2 and Part 4 of the bill. For example, the words “in association with” are part of the definition of “arrangements” in the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act. The act requires persons to register and provide information:

. . . in relation to arrangements entered into with foreign states or powers and their proxies under which persons undertake to carry out certain activities in relation to political or governmental processes in Canada.

It defines “arrangement” as, “. . . under which a person undertakes to carry out, under the direction of or in association with a foreign principal . . . .”

We have received clarification from officials that “arrangements” include not only formal contracts but other kinds of agreements that are less explicit. Here is what an official from Public Safety Canada said:

An arrangement wouldn’t need to be a written contract. It wouldn’t necessarily need to be spelled out on paper. It can be a verbal understanding. Ultimately, it would be up to the commissioner, based on the facts available to them, to determine whether there was an understanding, an arrangement, an agreement to conduct these influence activities. It’s purposely drafted in a way to not limit it to just that one contract that says I will pay you X to do Y.

In other words, the concept of “arrangement” is already very elastic. This is as it should be since we already have a Registry of Lobbyists that would require anyone who formally represents a foreign power to register under that measure. The new foreign influence transparency registry would close loopholes in the Registry of Lobbyists both by expanding the scope of covered activities and by using a broad definition of “arrangements.”

What, then, is the point of adding the phrase “in association with” to this definition of “arrangements”? Where does the phrase come from anyway? It turns out that this phrase is taken from the Criminal Code and pertains to the commission of offence for criminal organizations.

In the code, 467.12(1) says:

Every person who commits an indictable offence under this or any other Act of Parliament for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with, a criminal organization is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years.

There is some jurisprudence around the term “in association with.” In R. v. Ruzic, 2001, the Supreme Court explained that there is an implicit requirement that the accused committed the predicate offence with the intent to do so for the benefit of, at the direction of or in association with a group they knew had the composition of a criminal organization.

In R. v. Venneri, 2012, the Supreme Court highlighted the underlying principles behind the terms “in association with,” “benefit” and “at the direction of.” The court says the terms have a shared purpose:

Their common objective is to suppress organized crime. To this end, they especially target offences that are connected to the activities of criminal organizations and advance their interests.

Those rulings refer to the suppression of organized crime and the activities of criminal organizations. The proposed foreign influence transparency and accountability act, or FITAA, however, is not a registry of organized crime and criminal organizations. It is a transparency registry intended to encourage persons and organizations lobbying on behalf of a foreign principal to be transparent about their activities. Those activities are not illegal; they are certainly not criminal. The FITAA registry, after all, is not meant to be a blacklist; rather, it is a whitelist. In fact, one of the features of Bill C-70 is that anyone who is in compliance with the registry can legitimately carry out the political interference activities listed in Part 2 of Bill C-70.

The words “in association with” may have some utility in the prosecution of individuals involved in criminal gangs, but it is not helpful for the purposes of FITAA. On the contrary, the use of that criterion will force the commissioner to look for a foreign influence analogue to organized crime.

How will they do that? I believe it will boil down to the views expressed by the person suspected of being “in association with,” even if the point of the registry is not about screening for good or bad points of view. This has already been seen to be a problem in criminal cases where offences using the “in association with” term have allowed conduct to be criminalized that only has a tenuous connection to a criminal organization.

Take the case study of co-called malign foreign influence that was highlighted in the Minister of Public Safety’s consultation paper on the registry that we now have in Bill C-70. It paints a scenario whereby a Canadian academic is asked by an individual employed by a foreign government to write an op-ed opposing a position taken by the federal government without disclosing the foreign actor’s request to do so. This example sent shivers down my spine. It suggests that Canadians who have interactions with foreign governments are servile dupes who have no capacity for individual judgment or agency. How do we know that the Canadian did not already share the views of the foreign government or if they may have, in fact, influenced the foreign agent rather than the other way around?

The reality is that the commissioner of the registry will be hard pressed to determine if there was any direction from the foreign agent to the academic. The commissioner might have information about contact between the agent and the academic, but in the absence of information about direction, they will have to guess if the academic was “in association with” the foreign agent.

The likely starting point for such an assessment will be the views expressed by the academic. The government is passing the buck to the commissioner to determine how to define a vague and problematic term, and is counting upon the courts to fix any excess.

However, we should not go down this road in the first place by inviting the commissioner to perform such a task, and we can do so by removing the words “in association with” as part of the definition of “arrangements” with a foreign principal.

Honourable colleagues, if you think this is a marginal case study, let me give you an example that is closer to home.

When MPs and senators travel to another country as part of an interparliamentary association, they invariably meet with foreign principals who will bend the ears of their Canadian counterparts on policy issues that are important to them. Very often, Canadian parliamentarians will return to Ottawa and pass along those messages to the responsible minister, a senior bureaucrat or the party caucus. I have heard Hill colleagues advocate for lower cheese tariffs after a visit to the U.K.; a change in wine import quotas after visiting Wellington; the need to invest in liquefied natural gas, or LNG, export facilities after going to Berlin; or a plea to support Taiwan’s participation in the World Health Assembly after a sponsored trip to Taiwan. Are the MPs and senators “in association with” the foreign power, and do they have to register with the FITAA registry? After all, they are members of an association that explicitly seeks to influence and be influenced by their counterparts.

Perhaps you agree with the policy proposals advocated by the Brits, the Germans, the Kiwis and the Taiwanese, and are therefore inclined to discount the need for registration, but what if a parliamentary delegation came back from Beijing and advocated for more flights between China and Canada? What if they lobbied for Canada to not follow the lead of the United States in imposing massive tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, or EVs? Would those examples make you more inclined to insist on registration?

On the face of the bill, MPs and senators are not exempt from registration under FITAA. Perhaps the commissioner will issue a ruling to give all of us a pass, but what about our staffers?

What about the numerous — hundreds — bilateral and multilateral business associations in Canada that do very similar work as our interparliamentary associations, and that regularly meet with foreign officials to hear their views on policy issues that affect bilateral relations? Will members of the Canada-EU, Canada-Japan, Canada-U.S. or Canada-Africa business associations and councils have to register if they trigger any of the three criteria under FITAA simply because they are “in association with” the foreign power?

Just last week, the Business Council of Canada sent a letter to the Prime Minister warning that Canada faces “diplomatic isolation” in NATO if it doesn’t meet its defence spending target of 2%. I presume that Mr. Hyder, the CEO of the Business Council of Canada, believes we will face diplomatic isolation because he has had conversations with leaders of NATO governments who have told him as much. I am sure Mr. Hyder is not “directed by” those governments to lobby Ottawa, but can it not be said that he and his organization are “in association with” NATO governments in conveying such a message?

What about the hundreds of cultural, clan and civil society organizations in Canada that have intrinsic links with foreign governments and which might, from time to time, engage with public officials? Let me be clear: If any such groups have an “arrangement” or are acting “at the direction of” a foreign power, they should register, but in the absence of meeting such tests, does it make sense to use the woollier concept of “in association with” to force them to register?

You might think that it isn’t a big deal if parliamentarians, business associations and cultural and civil society groups have to register. So what if the term “in association with” captures a very broad swath of individuals and groups? But bear in mind that the phrase “in association with” also appears in Part 2 of the bill that deals with political interference for which the consequences are not trivial at all. The use of “in association with” could ensnare Canadians in criminal cases related to political interference because of their views or connections, with the threat of a maximum penalty of life imprisonment.

The open-ended nature of the phrase “in association with” will incline the commissioner and investigators to look at the backgrounds and views expressed by suspected agents as a proxy for being “in association.” Even if they do not specifically go in that direction, there will be public pressure upon them, including snitching and rumour mills, to make judgments about who should be required to register based upon the views they hold and the groups they associate with.

That is how McCarthyism started.

If you have any doubt this will happen, I offer myself as a case study. Yesterday, I learned that the Chinese Canadian Concern Group on the Chinese Communist Party’s Human Rights Violations has written to the Commissioner of the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference to question my loyalty and that of our former colleague Senator Victor Oh. To be specific, the concern group has urged the commissioner to review my participation in the commission by “. . . taking into consideration his past comments and associations.”

I suppose I should thank the Concern Group for providing me with such an egregious and timely example of stigmatization based on my “past comments and associations.” You can be sure that if Bill C-70 is passed, they and others will use the phrase “in association with” to stigmatize many other Canadians who have much fewer protections than I have. Indeed, they have already recklessly named other Chinese Canadians in the letter and cast them as possible foreign agents with zero evidence.

Hon. Yuen Pau Woo: Therefore, honourable senators, in amendment, I move:

That Bill C-70 be not now read a third time, but that it be amended,

(a)in clause 53,

(i)on page 26, by replacing line 28 with the following:

“rection or for the benefit of a for-”,

(ii)on page 28, by replacing lines 8 and 9 with the following:

“outside Canada, at the direction or for the benefit of a foreign entity or a terrorist group, in-”,

(iii)on page 29,

(A)by replacing line 11 with the following:

“rection or for the benefit of a for-”,

(B)by replacing lines 27 and 28 with the following:

“who, at the direction or for the benefit of a foreign entity, knowingly engages in surrepti-”,

(iv)on page 30, by replacing line 14 with the following:

“who, at the direction of a foreign”;

(b)in clause 113, on page 75, by replacing lines 5 and 6 with the following:

“person undertakes to carry out, under the direction of a foreign principal, any of the follow-”.

Honourable colleagues, I thank you for your attention. I hope you will you support my amendment.

Hon. Marc Gold (Government Representative in the Senate): Honourable senators, I rise to speak briefly to Senator Woo’s proposed amendment to Bill C-70.

[English]

I thank Senator Woo for his heartfelt remarks. I thank Senator Dean for his sponsorship, his very responsible carriage of this bill and his remarks today. And I thank the members of the committee, who worked diligently to study this bill during the time that they had.

This chamber is at its best when thoughtful people engage in vigorous, civil debate about matters of consequence, and that’s what’s happening here today.

I know we all count ourselves fortunate to be part of a country and an institution where this kind of debate is not only possible but encouraged, and it’s an honour for me to be part of it.

Bill C-70 has been developed in that spirit, with the aim of protecting our democratic institutions and the values of openness and transparency that make Canada, Canada.

We can’t take our democracy for granted. We can’t ignore the reality that some foreign powers — among others — would like to see our democracy sour and rot and are actively working to make that happen. We have a responsibility to protect people who have come to Canada in search of safety and freedom from the tentacles of the regimes they fled.

Colleagues, I’m confident that we’re all on the same page in that regard. Our debate today — and our debate on this amendment, in particular — is about how exactly to do so.

It’s important for people to demand vigilance and thoughtfulness from legislation, particularly when it relates to national security, so that we don’t unintentionally solve some problems by creating others. That’s what Senator Woo is attempting to do in this case, and I thank him again for it.

One of the main objectives of Bill C-70 is to protect members of diaspora communities. The last thing any of us want to do is feed suspicion and persecution of fellow Canadians on the basis of national origin or ethnicity. The concerns Senator Woo has expressed are legitimate, important and should not be taken lightly.

We each come to this chamber with perspectives shaped by our background and experience. Bringing those perspectives to bear as part of the legislative process is an act of patriotic service to Canada.

To that end, I will now share my views about this amendment.

Colleagues, in short, I cannot support this amendment.

As we’ve heard, the amendment proposes to remove the phrase “in association with” from two areas of the bill, as set out and explained by Senator Woo in his remarks. Let me address them each in turn.

The first of these areas is the Security of Information Act, a bill that has been on the books for some time and is being amended with proposed amendments in Bill C-70. Bill C-70 would create or expand several offences in that act involving activity undertaken “. . . at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with . . .” a foreign entity.

These offences include the use of intimidation, threats or violence in proposed sections 20 and 20.1; conducting an indictable offence for a foreign entity in proposed section 20.2; and engaging in surreptitious or deceptive conduct harmful to the interests of Canada in proposed section 20.3.

The bill also creates the offence of engaging in surreptitious or deceptive conduct with the intent of influencing political, governmental and certain other processes at the direction of or in association with a foreign entity in proposed section 20.4.

Colleagues, in all these cases, a person has to be engaged in malign activity. On their face, these provisions do not criminalize mere association with a foreign entity. Rather, they target people who are up to no good, using threats, violence, intimidation and deceit. Someone engaged in this kind of activity should be subject to prosecution.

The government disagrees that these provisions are over-broad or ambiguous. As I mentioned, section 20 of the Security of Information Act already contains a provision — and that’s the one I referred to earlier — and it has been in force for many years. It has always included the phrase “in association with.” This is nothing new in this area of the law. Indeed, in one important aspect, Bill C-70 actually removes ambiguity from the existing law.

Let me explain. The existing section 20, which is currently in force, prohibits the use of “. . . threat, accusation, menace or violence . . .” to induce someone to do something harmful to Canada “. . . at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity . . . .” That’s the law as it stands now. Bill C-70 would replace the terms “menace” and “accusation” with “intimidation,” a term better understood in Canadian criminal law, notably in the context of extortion.

That’s not an unhelpful analogy with regard to some of these offences. They are extortion-type offences, albeit not for monetary gain but for the nefarious purpose of interfering in our democratic processes.

As I said, this provision which is currently in force includes the “in association with” phrasing. So, the proposed amendment offered by Senator Woo would actually water down the existing statute. That would certainly be contrary to the government’s intent, which is to more effectively deter and to allow for the prosecution of malign activity where a foreign entity is involved.

I’ll turn now to the second area where the proposed amendment would apply, and that is the foreign influence transparency and accountability act.

This new act is not about malign activity. It’s simply about transparency. Bill C-70 would require people to register if they’re attempting to influence political or democratic processes in Canada “. . . under the direction of or in association with a foreign principal . . . .”

Colleagues, there is no implication that such activities are inherently bad, and there is no attempt to discourage them or curtail them. The government’s objective is simply to ensure that Canadians know where political messaging is coming from and who is behind it. It is the same concept as the lobbying registry, which doesn’t prevent lobbying; it simply promotes transparency.

Removing “in association with,” as this amendment proposes, would create a sizable loophole in the requirement to register, and it therefore undercuts the transparency objective.

When it comes to political communication, relationships between foreign actors and people in Canada are not usually so straightforward as to involve written contracts or explicit direction. There may be situations, for example, where a foreign regime funds a think tank in Canada. Now, the regime may not direct the think tank’s specific actions and communications, but Canadians at least are entitled to know who is bankrolling it, regardless of what the think tank’s positions were or are and where they originated.

Or the agent of a foreign country might approach a Canadian academic and encourage them to make certain public statements or publish certain articles, without giving explicit instructions. Under Bill C-70, the academic would be free to do so. They would just have to be transparent about it. The proposed amendment, on the other hand, would relieve them of that obligation of transparency.

Colleagues, foreign actors can be quite skilled at finding weaknesses in our laws and exploiting them. By removing “in association with” and limiting the registry to situations where there is explicit direction from a foreign principal, we would be pre-emptively hollowing out this new registry.

Colleagues, the purpose of this bill is to better protect Canada from foreign interference and transnational repression and to promote transparency with regard to political communication and influence. Bill C-70, looked at as a whole, enhances the tool kit that is available to our national security and intelligence agencies to help them counter these growing phenomena. A spectrum of tools could be brought to bear from transparency requirements, on the one hand, to administrative monetary penalties to investigation to prosecution — all depending on the context.

Similarly, the new foreign influence transparency commissioner would likewise have a range of tools at their disposal, from issuing guidance and warnings to making referrals to law enforcement. In other words, this bill is not a blunt instrument. It is a very nuanced one, a nuanced approach to a nuanced and challenging issue.

As I said at the outset, I’m sensitive to Senator Woo’s concerns. We are all aware that well-intended legislation can have unintended consequences, especially in the national security space.

I would remind senators that we have taken significant steps in recent years to strengthen oversight and accountability in this regard. We now have institutions like NSICOP and NSIRA, which didn’t exist when anti-terror laws were adopted in years past.

Legislating in this space will always be a matter of trying to strike the right balance: protecting civil liberties while protecting our national security and national institutions. The government believes that this bill strikes that balance appropriately, and, as demonstrated by the vote in the other place, members of the House of Commons emphatically agree.

The other place is also of the view that these new statutes should be operational before the next election, a goal that would be jeopardized if we return the bill to them at this point in the calendar.

I understand that the Senate’s National Security Committee has had initial discussions about the possibility of staying engaged with Bill C-70. Senator Dean alluded to that. That could include following the implications and studying its implementation when we return in the fall. From the government’s point of view, this sounds like a very worthwhile endeavour, and it’s a good way of respecting the desire of the other place and of the public to respond to emerging threats in a timely way while doing our due diligence and carrying a watching brief in our role as senators.

Once again, I want to thank Senator Woo for his contributions to the study of this bill. Senator Woo, I trust that you will be an eager participant in any further committee study of Bill C-70 and related issues, and our chamber would certainly benefit from your involvement.

For the moment, though, I encourage honourable senators to oppose this amendment and support this legislation as drafted. Thank you for your kind attention.

The Hon. the Speaker: Resuming debate on the amendment. Two people have shown an interest in asking a question, and there are 19 seconds left. Senator Woo, you have the floor.

[English]

Hon. Yuen Pau Woo: I ask for another five minutes.

An Hon. Senator: No.

Hon. Tony Dean: Honourable senators, I’ll be brief. I’m going to add to comments already made about our colleague Senator Woo: No one can unravel complex and indecipherable statutes as well as our good friend there, and that’s a skill indeed. I’m grateful to Senator Woo for bringing these ideas and this proposal to our attention.

Senator Woo feels that the framing of the language, to put it simply, casts too wide a net. I think, from my reading and intention of this, that a registry is indeed intended to cast a wide net. That is its purpose. I think it has two purposes: to cast a wide net, to see what that net looks like and then to look at actors and individuals who may not have chosen to join the registry. It’s an interesting device and tool, and we see it used in other regulatory contexts.

The discussion about scope is critically important, and I’m glad that we’re having it. My own concern with this is that the solution to that as proposed by Senator Woo would narrow the scope of this and move too much in the other direction, if I can put it that way, and that we’d end up with a relatively small number of registrants, and one of the purposes of the registry would be defeated.

That’s a concern that I have, and for that reason I’m not inclined to support the amendment even though I find it painful to do that, I will admit.

As Senator Woo mentioned, there will be a commissioner. That commissioner, hopefully, will be appointed early, and we’ll have a role in that appointment. I suspect that commissioner will deal very quickly with issues like parliamentary travel and what I would call the extraneous group of concerns that have been raised about this, and they should be concerned, but I think they’re easily dealt with.

At the end of the day, my concern is what we would be left with if we were to adopt this and how that would operate within this scheme and its relationship with other elements of a complex of instruments that is being contemplated in terms of pushing foreign interference to the ground.

So there it is: it’s brief and straightforward, and I’ll leave it at that. Thank you, Senator Woo.

Hon. Denise Batters: Senator Gold, thank you for your speech on this. I have a few more legal points.

I think it’s actually a good thing that the phrase “in association with” is used in a major federal statute. Senator Woo provided an example of that from the Criminal Code, and you provided a few more. It’s also a good thing there is already federal case law, including the Supreme Court of Canada — as Senator Woo himself referenced — interpreting that phrase, “in association with.” There are likely other federal statutes other than the Criminal Code which probably also use the phrase “in association with.”

So using language which is contained in other statutes and has been well interpreted by courts is a positive thing for federal legislation.

As well, from Senator Woo’s reference, it sounds like the Supreme Court of Canada did not rule the phrase “in association with” to be overbroad in that Criminal Code case that he referenced.

Given all of that, wouldn’t you agree that it lends credence to the same phrase, “in association with” and would not be found to be overbroad for those reasons as well?

Hon. Pierre J. Dalphond: I will say only a few words. Just to make some additional statements, though I agree with Senator Gold on all he said, including on the very relevant comments that were made by Senator Woo, which I respect very much.

What he said could be true in a different context, but we have to remember here that this bill could not lead to McCarthyism. Joseph McCarthy was running a United States Congress committee that was politically judging people who were charged with being communist, who were close to communism or who were sharing views that were considered to be communist views.

Here we are creating offences that will be dealt with by the Crown office that will have to charge somebody before a court of law. The accused appear before a judge — a woman or a man of certain qualifications who has to act impartially and not in the pursuit of political gains or opposing political enemies or political wins. We should not compare; there is no danger of McCarthyism here. I think this is, unfortunately, an overreach comment.

The second point I want to make is that “in association with” is not a new concept. It is a concept well-known to the criminal law. It is found in many places in the Criminal Code, and it was very useful to have in the fight against gangs, especially in Quebec with the biker gangs.

The term “in association with” is also used in the Security of Information Act , which is the first amendment that is on the list of proposed amendments, where the words “in association with” has been found since 2001. What the bill has been amended is to add intimidation to the provision but not the concept of “in association with.” This is not something new. This is something that has been there for 25 years, so far without a problem.

That said, my third and last comment is about the words “in association with.” As Senator Woo referred, very properly, the Supreme Court of Canada had to look at this concept in an appeal from the Court of Appeal of Quebec in 2001. The Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeal of Quebec. I was not part of the panel, incidentally, but the court disagreed with the Court of Appeal of Quebec on one point: the definition of “in association with.” It was about biker gangs.

Just to summarize, that judgment reached exactly what Senator Patterson was aiming at. At paragraph 43 of the Supreme Court decision in Venneri which was unanimous and written by Justice Fish, a former colleague of the Court of Appeal:

The phrase “in association with” should be interpreted in accordance with its plain meaning and statutory context. It is accompanied here by the terms “at the direction of” and “for the benefit of.

That is exactly the same situation we have here.

These phrases are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they have a shared purpose and will often overlap in their application. Their common objective is to suppress organized crime.

Here it is to suppress foreign interference. To this end, they especially target acts that are connected to the activities of foreign organizations and advance their interests. To this end, they especially target offences that are connected with the intent to interfere in the political process in Canada.

In my view, we should trust the system. I trust the courts. I trust what we are trying to do here. It is nothing new. I believe this: When the words “in association with” are read with “under the direction of” and “to the benefit of,” in the context of the bill they are clear: it is about foreign interference.

You have to read all these things together. I know Senator Woo doesn’t have to believe me all the way, and he is not paying me, so I’m giving free advice. Free advice is always worth the price you pay for it, but I’m giving the advice that I’m not concerned, and I will vote against the amendment and vote for the bill.

Hon. Rebecca Patterson: Senator Dean, will you take a question?

The Hon. the Speaker: The vote will take place at 5:29 p.m. Call in the senators.

Motion in amendment of the Honourable Senator Woo negatived on the following division:

Senator LaBoucane-Benson: Honourable senators, I ask for leave of the Senate to interrupt the debate on Bill C-70 in order to take Bill C-69 into consideration at second reading now, with the debate on Bill C-70 resuming once the proceedings on Bill C-69 have concluded for the day.

Hon. Senators: Agreed.

The Hon. the Speaker: Is leave granted?

Some Hon. Senators: No.

The Hon. the Speaker: Are senators ready for the question?

The Hon. the Speaker: All those opposed to the motion will please say “nay.”

Hon. Senators: Question.

Some Hon. Senators: Agreed.