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House Hansard - 336

44th Parl. 1st Sess.
September 16, 2024 11:00AM
Context: House Hansard - 336 - Sep/16/24
Hon. Andrew Scheer (Regina—Qu'Appelle, CPC)
  • Sep/16/24 12:21:33 p.m.
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I want to pause here to recognize the Privacy Commissioner's, our former law clerk's, gold standard approach. He provided a set of records with what he called proposed redactions along with a clean copy of the records, because, as he wrote, “these provisions [of the Access to Information Act] do not limit the House of Commons' constitutional authority to seek and obtain information and documents.” At least he gets it. Regardless, there is clear and convincing evidence before the House today that a contempt was committed by the government's flagrant and systematic disobedience to the House's June 10 order. While I think it is clear-cut, it is, of course, ultimately a decision for the House to take. In his March 9, 2011, ruling, Mr. Speaker Milliken cited page 281 of Sir John Bourinot's Parliamentary Procedure and Practice in the Dominion of Canada, fourth edition: But it must be remembered that under all circumstances it is for the house to consider whether the reasons given for refusing the information are sufficient. The right of Parliament to obtain every possible information on public questions is undoubted, and the circumstances must be exceptional, and the reasons very cogent, when it cannot be at once laid before the houses. From there, the Chair added, at page 8841 of the Debates: It may be that valid reasons exist. That is not for the Chair to judge. A committee empowered to investigate the matter might, but the Chair is ill-equipped to do so. However, there is no doubt that an order to produce documents is not being fully complied with, and this is a serious matter that goes to the heart of the House's undoubted role in holding the government to account. The U.K. procedure committee, in its May 2019 report, concluded, at paragraph 16, “The way in which the power [to require the production of papers] is exercised is a matter for the House and not subject to the discretion of the Chair.” That committee commented, at paragraph 35, similarly to the views of Mr. Speaker Milliken, on the means of assessing compliance: There is no recognised procedure to assess the papers provided to the House as a whole in response to a resolution or order, and no means of appeal against non-compliance, short of raising the issue as a matter of privilege. Where papers have been provided to a body of the House, compliance has been easier to assess. Select committees in receipt of papers have been able to review the information they have received and to determine whether the House's instructions have been complied with. The U.K. procedure committee concluded, at paragraph 86: The House alone determines the scope of its power to call for papers. In its consideration of each motion it is able to discern whether an inappropriate or irresponsible use of the power is sought, and whether it is being asked to require the production of information from Ministers on a scale disproportionate to the matter under debate. We expect that in each such case the House will continue to exercise its judgment in favour of a responsible use of the power. A similar point was also made in the first report of our House's former Standing Committee on Privileges and Elections, tabled on May 29, 1991, and of which the House took note on June 18, 1991: It is well established that Parliament has the right to order any and all documents to be laid before it which it believes are necessary for its information. ... The power to call for persons, papers and records is absolute, but it is seldom exercised without consideration of the public interest. In our present case, the House has before it, I would submit, a thorough record upon which to take a decision. The law clerk's reports, with the annexed correspondence from assorted deputy heads, lay before the House both sides of the argument. Personally, I side with the law clerk and his defence of the rights of Parliament. For those who would advocate that we must temper the House's authority with a willingness to accept the government's decisions to withhold information, supposedly in the name of the public interest, I would recall that these balancing acts are represented within the House's own self-restraint and not by any veto exercised by an outside authority. Mr. Speaker Milliken articulated the concept on April 27, 2010, at page 2043 of the Debates: It is the view of the Chair that accepting an unconditional authority of the executive to censor the information provided to Parliament would in fact jeopardize the very separation of powers that is purported to lie at the heart of our parliamentary system and the independence of its constituent parts. Furthermore, it risks diminishing the inherent privileges of the House and its members, which have been earned and must be safeguarded. As has been noted earlier, procedural authorities are categorical in repeatedly asserting the powers of the House in ordering the production of documents. No exceptions are made for any category of government documents, even those related to national security. Therefore, the Chair must conclude that it is perfectly within the existing privileges of the House to order production of the documents in question. Having established that it is for the House to decide how to exercise its authority in ordering the production of papers, how can we go about such mechanisms to strike the right balance?
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